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CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP:
ARE STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRAS THE
ANSWER?
Kathryn L. Moore*

INTRODUCTION
As the Baby Boom generation reaches retirement age, retirement income security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. The federal
government devotes billions of dollars in tax incentives each year toward encouraging employers and their employees to save for retirement.1 Yet retirement savings in this nation remain woefully inadequate.2 Analysts, policymakers, and legislators have introduced a host of strategies to address the
retirement savings gap.3 This Article examines one of the more recent and
innovative strategies: state automatic enrollment IRAs.
*

Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law. The author would like to thank Tina Brooks, Franklin Runge, Beau Steenken, Ryan Valentine, and
Richard Wooldridge for their research assistance and Scott Bauries, Israel Goldowitz, Maria O’Brien
Hylton, Stan Panis, Natalya Shnister, Paul Secunda, Norman Stein, Steve Utkus, and Jean Young for their
insights and comments.
1 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the favorable tax treatment accorded employersponsored pensions, including plans for the self-employed, will result in an estimated $881.5 billion in
foregone tax revenues between 2015 and 2019. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG.,
ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019 39 (Comm. Print 2015).
2 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST
HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 (2015) (finding, among other things,
that about half of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings); Jack VanDerhei, Auto-IRAs:
How Much Would They Increase the Probability of “Successful” Retirements and Decrease Retirement
Deficits? Preliminary Evidence from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model, 36 EBRI NOTES
(Emp’t Benefit Research Inst.), June 2015, at 19–20 (estimating retirement savings shortfalls in present
value (in 2014 dollars) at age 65 of $36,387 (per individual) for those ages 60-64 and $54,120 for those
ages 35-39 for an estimated aggregate national retirement deficit of $4.13 trillion for all U.S households
where head of household is between 35 and 64 years of age); Ruth Helman et al., The 2014 Retirement
Confidence Survey: Confidence Rebounds–For Those With Retirement Plans, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF no. 397
(Emp’t Benefit Research Inst.), Mar. 2014, at 6 (reporting that only 18 and 37 percent of workers were
very confident or somewhat confident, respectively, that they would have adequate money in retirement);
Alicia H. Munnell et al., NRRI Update Shows Half Still Falling Short, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B. C., Dec.
2014, at 3 (reporting that National Retirement Risk Index shows that 52 percent of households in 2013
were at risk of being unable to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement).
3 For a discussion of various approaches to increasing retirement savings, see, for example, U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-556, RETIREMENT SECURITY: FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP
STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR COVERAGE 9-10 (2015) (describing federal saver’s credit
and myRA); Alicia H. Munnell, Falling Short: The Coming Retirement Crisis and What to Do About It,
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Drawing on the insights from behavioral law and economics, coined as
one of “the most promising and exciting new developments in public policymaking theory and practice,”4 automatic enrollment IRAs were officially unveiled in February 2006 by Mark Iwry, then a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, and David John, then a senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation.5 A host of federal bills providing for the creation of an automatic
enrollment IRA program have been introduced in Congress since 2006.6 In
addition, each of the President’s federal budget proposals has included funding for an automatic enrollment IRA program since 2009,7 when Mark Iwry
became Senior Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Assistant

CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B. C., Apr. 2015, at 6 (describing three prong approach to addressing retirement
crisis); CHRISTIAN E. WELLER & THERESA GHILARDUCCI, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LAYING THE
GROUNDWORK FOR MORE EFFICIENT RETIREMENT SAVINGS INCENTIVES 7–15 (2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/17071405/RetirementsIncentives-report.pdf (offering five
policy recommendations).
4 Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014).
5 J. MARK IWRY & DAVID C. JOHN, PURSUING UNIVERSAL RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGH
AUTOMATIC IRAS 1 (working drft. Feb. 12, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/02
/pursuing- universal-retirement-security-through-automatic-iras; see also Frances Denmark, Going to
War over Retirement Security, INSTITUTIONAL INV’R. (June 17, 2015), http://www.institutionalinvestor.
com/Article/3463046/Going-to-War-over-Retirement-Security.html (Mark Iwry, then a senior fellow the
Brookings Institution, and David John, then a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, unveiled
their Automatic IRA program at the Heritage Foundation on Valentine’s Day 2006.).
6 See, e.g., S. 2472, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 506, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 245, 114th Cong. (2015);
H.R. 2035, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 4049, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 1557, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 6099,
111th Cong. (2010); S. 3760, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2167, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1141, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R. 6210, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3952, 109th Cong. (2006).
7 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 152 tbl.S-9 (2016); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 120 tbl.S-9 (2015); OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2015 189 tbl.S-9 (2014); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014 209 tbl.S-9 (2013); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013
218 tbl.S-9 (2012); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 183 tbl.S-8 (2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 160 tbl.S-8 (2010); OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING
AMERICA’S PROMISE [BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010] 122 tbl.S-6 (2009); see
also Derek B. Dorn et al., States Dive Headfirst Into Retirement Coverage Debate—But Will Their Initiatives Run Afoul of Federal Law?, 42 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 219, 220 (2015) (“[T]he Automatic IRA
has been the centerpiece of [President Obama’s] administration’s retirement policy and has been included
in every annual budget proposal that he has sent to Congress.”); Denmark, supra note 5 (“The Automatic
IRA has been submitted in every federal budget since 2009 but has yet to pass.”).
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Secretary (Tax Policy) for Retirement and Health Policy at the Treasury Department.8 Despite this interest and support, the proposals have not gained
traction.9
Given the federal gridlock, states have stepped in to fill the breach.
Since 2012, more than twenty-five states have considered proposals to study
or establish retirement savings programs for private-sector employees.10
Moreover, five states—California,11 Illinois,12 Oregon,13 Maryland,14 and
Connecticut15—have enacted legislation establishing state automatic enrollment IRA programs.16
This Article considers whether these programs are likely to fill the retirement savings gap. Part I begins by providing a broad overview of state
automatic enrollment IRA programs and describes the legislation enacted in
California, Illinois, and Oregon. Part II then addresses the question of
whether these programs are “employee benefit plans” for purposes of
ERISA. Finally, in Part III, the Article addresses the ultimate question of
whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are likely to fill the retirement savings gap.
Proponents of state automatic enrollment IRA programs point to the
positive experience with automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans to contend that
these state programs are an answer, or at least a partial answer, to increasing
retirement savings in this country. The efficacy of such programs, however,
8

Denmark, supra note 5.
When the first automatic IRA bills were introduced, they enjoyed bipartisan support. Now, however, no Republicans support the concept. Two reasons are offered to explain the loss of Republican support: (1) many of the Republican legislators who supported the first bills are no longer in Congress; and
(2) since the enactment of “Obamacare,” “the prospect of new mandates on employers has become universally anathema among Republicans in Congress.” Dorn et al., supra note 7, at 220.
10 See Look to the States for Innovation, GEO. UNIV. CTR FOR RET. INITIATIVES,
http://cri.georgetown.edu/states (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). See also State-based retirement plans for the
private sector, PENSION RIGHTS CTR., http://www.pensionrights.org/issues/legislation/state-based-retirement-plans-private-sector (last updated May 2016). In some of the states, employer participation would
be mandatory while in other states employer participation would be voluntary. In all states, employees
would have the opportunity to opt out, that is, choose not to participate in the program. See, e.g., Dorn et
al., supra note 7, at 229–34 (describing legislation proposed to create a state-run retirement arrangement
in eight different states).
11 California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified at CAL.
GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–100044 (West 2013)).
12 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2016)).
13 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.200–
245 (2015)).
14 Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323.
15 An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 (Reg.
Sess.).
16 Massachusetts has also enacted legislation, but its program is limited to nonprofit organizations.
See An Act Providing Retirement Options for Nonprofit Organizations, 2012 Mass. Acts 100–02 (codified
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 64E (2013)).
9
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raises complicated and nuanced questions. The Article identifies both fundamental and a host of subsidiary, sometimes overlapping, questions raised by
such programs, and offers important insights on how to answer the many
issues implicated by these questions.
I.

OVERVIEW OF STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRA PROGRAMS

State automatic enrollment IRA programs are one of a variety of approaches states are considering to address the serious retirement savings gap
that this country faces.17 The programs encourage private-sector employees
to establish tax-favored individual retirement accounts (IRAs), which are
funded through payroll deductions, to save for retirement. Generally, the
state programs require employers that do not offer retirement savings plans
to participate in the program.18 As discussed below, employees in the programs are automatically enrolled in state-administered IRAs, and money is
automatically deducted from the employees’ paycheck and deposited in the
IRAs. The programs identify a default contribution amount (e.g., 3 percent
of compensation) that is automatically contributed to the IRA unless the employee affirmatively elects not to participate in the program. The state is responsible for administering the plan, but employers are responsible for forwarding employee contributions to the plan and for providing employees
with information about the program.
This Section describes the automatic enrollment IRA programs enacted
in California, Illinois, and Oregon.
A.

California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program

In September 2012, S.B. 1234, titled the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act of 2012 (“California Act”), was signed into law.19

17

States are considering at least three other approaches to increasing retirement savings: (1) small
business marketplaces; (2) prototype plans; and (3) multiple employer plans (MEPs). See Interpretive
Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate Plans Covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936, 71,937–38 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 2509) (providing guidance on these three approaches); see also DAVID E. MORSE, GEO.
UNIV. CTR FOR RET. INITIATIVES, STATE INITIATIVES TO EXPAND THE AVAILABILITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT PLANS: HOW FEDERAL LAWS APPLY TO PLAN DESIGN
OPTIONS
10
(2014),
http://cri.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/
Morse_CRIPaper.pdf (describing three different types of retirement plans states may establish for private
sector employees: IRAs, 401(k)/defined contribution plans, and defined benefit plans).
18 See discussion infra Part I.
19 California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified as
amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–100044 (West 2012)).
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The California Act established the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program (“California Program”), which is intended to provide a voluntary, low-risk automatic enrollment retirement savings plan for private-sector
California workers who currently do not have access to retirement savings
plans through their jobs.20
Generally, the California Act requires employers with five or more employees to establish a payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement to permit employees to participate in the California Program.21 Employers, however, are not required to participate in the California Program if they offer an
employer-sponsored retirement plan.22 Eligible employees are automatically
enrolled in the program unless they opt out of participation.23
The California Act creates the California Secure Choice Retirement
Savings Investment Board (“California Investment Board”) to administer the
program.24 The Board is composed of the California State Treasurer, the Director of Finance or his or her designee, the Controller, and six other individuals appointed by the Governor or legislators.25
The California Investment Board administers the California Secure
Choice Retirement Savings Trust (“California Trust”),26 a trust into which
employees’ payroll contributions are pooled. Under recently enacted legislation amending and adding to certain sections of the California code, the California Board is authorized to establish managed accounts invested in United
States Treasuries or similarly safe investments for the first three years of the
Program’s operation.27 During this initial period, the board is authorized to
develop investment options that address risk sharing and the smoothing of
market losses and gains.28 Authorized options include custom pooled, professionally managed funds that minimize costs and fees, the creation of a reserve
fund, or the establishment of investment products.29 The California Board is
directed to strive to implement program features that provide the maximum
20 See id. at § 3 (codified as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004); California Secure Choice: Making Workplace Retirement Savings Possible for Millions of Californians, CAL. STATE TREASURER JOHN CHIANG,
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/index.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2016).
21 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d) (West 2013) (defining “[e]ligible employer” as “a person or entity
engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other enterprise in the state, whether for profit or not
for profit, excluding the federal government, the state, any county, any municipal corporation, or any of
the state’s units or instrumentalities, that has five or more employees and that satisfies the requirements
to establish or participate in a payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement”).
22 Id. at § 100032(d), (f).
23 Id. at § 100032(e), (g).
24 Id. at § 100002.
25 Id. at § 100002(a)(1).
26 Id. at § 100004.
27 An Act to Amend Sections of the Government Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, 2012
Cal. Stat. ch. 804 (codified as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(1)(A)).
28 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(2)(B) (West 2013).
29 Id.
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possible income replacement balanced with appropriate risk in an IRA-based
environment.30
The default contribution rate is set at 3 percent of wages,31 although the
California Investment Board has the authority to adjust the default rate to
between 2 percent and 5 percent.32 In addition, the California Investment
Board may elect to establish different rates within this range for different
employees based on how long the employee has been participating in the
program.33 Employer contributions are permitted so long as they “would not
cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan” under ERISA.34
The California Investment Board was charged with conducting a market
analysis and feasibility study and reporting to the California legislature its
recommendations as to whether legislation implementing the California Program should be enacted.35 The market analysis and feasibility study, finding
the program to be “feasible, sustainable, and legally permissible,”36 was issued on January 31, 2016.37 Legislation approving the program and implementing it as of January 1, 2017, was approved on September 29, 2016.38
B.

Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program

In January 2015, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed into law the Illinois
Secure Choice Savings Program Act (“Illinois Act”).39 The Illinois Act is intended to provide employees with the opportunity and tools to save for retirement through “an automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA.”40

30

Id. at § 100002(e)(2)(A).
Id. at § 100032(h).
32 Id. at § 100032(i).
33 Id. at § 100032(h).
34 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(k) (West 2013).
35 See The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified
as CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100040, 100042) (charging the California Investment Board with conducting the
market analysis and feasibility study). But see S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, §§ 12, 13 (Cal. 2016)
(repealing §§ 100040, 100042 after the report and recommendation were issued).
36 See Letter from Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., to Hon. Kevin de Leon (Mar. 28, 2016),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/recommendations/index.asp.
37 The feasibility study was issued on January 31, 2016. See Overture Financial LLC, California
Secure Choice Market Analysis, Feasibility Study, and Program Design Consultation Services 5 (2016),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/report.pdf.
38 S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, § 16 (Cal. 2016).
39 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2016)). See also Michael Bologna, Illinois Governor Signs Into Law Groundbreaking Automatic IRA Bill, 42 PENS. & BEN. REP (BNA) 33, 37 (2015) (“Gov. Pat Quinn (D) on Jan. 4
signed S.B. 2758, which creates the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program.”).
40 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 80/10 (2016).
31

2016]

CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP

41

All employers subject to the Illinois Act must enroll each of their employees in the Illinois Program unless the employee opts out.41 Employers42
with twenty-five or more employees43 are subject to the Illinois Act unless
they have offered their employees an employer-sponsored tax-favored retirement plan44 in the preceding two years.45
The Illinois Act calls for the creation of a trust fund (“Illinois Fund”)
that is separate from the State Treasury.46 Moneys in the Illinois Fund are to
consist of the employee contributions to the fund, which are accounted for as
individual accounts.47 Employee contributions may be made either through
automatic payroll deductions or through an employee’s affirmative election
to contribute to the Illinois Program.48 Amounts held in the Illinois Fund are
not to be commingled with State funds and the State is to have no claim to or
against, or any interest in, money held in the fund.49
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board (“Illinois Board”) is charged
with designing, establishing, and operating the Illinois Fund.50 The Illinois
Board is required to engage an investment manager or managers to invest the
Illinois Fund.51 At the minimum, a single investment option must be established and offered: a life-cycle fund with a target date based upon the age of
the employee enrolled in the plan.52 In addition, four other investment options
may be established and offered: (1) a conservation principal protection fund,
(2) a growth fund, (3) a “secure return” fund, and (4) an annuity fund.53 The
41

Id. at § 80/60(b).
Employers who have been in business for less than two years are not subject to the Act. See id.
at § 80/5 (defining “Employer” to include requirement that employer have been in business for at least 2
years).
43 The Illinois Act applies a one-year look back period to determine whether the 25-employee
threshold is satisfied. See id. (defining “Employer” to include requirement that employer has “at no time
during the previous calendar year employed fewer than 25 employees in the State.”).
44 Technically, the Illinois Act defines “Employer” as including a requirement that the employer
have “not offered a qualified retirement plan” in the preceding two years and defines “qualified retirement
plan” as a plan “including, but not limited to, a plan qualified under Section 401(a), Section 401(k), Section 403(a), Section 403(b), Section 408(k), Section 408(p), or Section 457(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.”). Id.
45 See id. at § 80/60(a) (requiring “employers” to “establish a payroll deposit retirement savings
arrangement to allow each employee to participate in the Program.”); id. at § 80/5 (defining “employer”).
46 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a) (2016).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at § 80/15(b).
50 Id. at § 80/30.
51 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/40(a) (2015).
52 Id. at § 80/45(a).
53 Id. at § 80/45(b) (a “secure return” fund is a fund “whose primary objective is the preservation of
the safety of principal and the provision of a stable and low-risk rate of return; if the Board elects to
establish a secure return fund, the Board may procure any insurance, annuity, or other product to insure
the value of the individuals’ accounts and guarantee a rate of return; the cost of such a funding mechanism
42
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life-cycle fund is to serve as the default investment option for employees who
do not elect an investment option unless and until a secure return fund is
established and the Illinois Board determines that the secure return fund
should replace the target date or life-cycle fund as the default investment option.54
Employees may select any of the available investment options and may
change their investment option at any time, subject to rules promulgated by
the Illinois Board.55 The default contribution level is set at 3 percent of
wages.56 Employees, however, may select a different contribution level, expressed either as a percentage of wages or a dollar amount, up to the IRC §
219(b)(1)(A) limit,57 which is $5,500 in 2016.58
Benefits in the Illinois Program are not guaranteed. Instead, interest and
investment earnings and losses are allocated to each individual employee’s
program account.59 Each participant’s benefit is equal to the participant’s individual Illinois Program account balance at the time the participant’s retirement savings benefit becomes payable.60
C.

Oregon Retirement Savings Plan

On June 25, 2015, Oregon governor Kate Brown approved legislation
(the “Oregon Act”) establishing the Oregon Retirement Savings Board,
which is charged with developing the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan for
Oregon employees.61 The law is intended to provide a retirement savings vehicle for the million Oregonians who do not have access to a retirement savings plan at work.62
The Oregon Retirement Savings Board consists of seven members: the
State Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee, four individuals appointed by the

shall be paid out of the Fund; under no circumstances shall the Board, Program, Fund, State, or participating employer assume any liability for investment or actuarial risk.”).
54 Id. at § 80/45(a), (c).
55 Id. at § 80/60(d).
56 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60(c) (2016).
57 Id.
58 Internal Revenue Service, IRS Announces 2016 Pension Plan Limitations; 401(k) Contribution
Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2016 (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/
Newsroom/IRS- Announces-2016-Pension-Plan-Limitations%3B-401(k)-Contribution-Limit-RemainsUnchanged-at-$18,000-for-2016.
59 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/50 (2016).
60 Id.
61 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 2 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §
178.205 (2015)).
62 See Jennifer Dowling & KOIN 6 News Staff, No Way to Save for Retirement? Oregon Changing
That: Oregon Retirement Savings Plan Takes Effect July 1, 2017, KOIN 6 NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://koin.com/2016/03/23/no- way-to-save-for-retirement-oregon-changing-that/.
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Governor, a member of the Senate, and a member of the House of Representatives.63 The Oregon Retirement Savings Board is tasked with developing the
Oregon Retirement Savings Plan.64 The Board is granted the power to establish, implement, and maintain the plan, to adopt rules for the general administration of the plan, to direct the investment of the funds contributed to the
plan, to collect fees to defray the cost of administering the plan, and to make
and enter into contracts as needed to implement the plan.65
The Oregon Act broadly outlines the requirements for the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan. Like the California and Illinois laws, the Oregon Act
calls for mandatory participation by employers unless the employer offers a
“qualified retirement plan”66 and provides for automatic enrollment but permits employees to opt-out of participation.67 The Oregon Act does not set a
default contribution rate, but instead leaves it to the Board to establish the
rate.68 It authorizes automatic escalation of contributions,69 prohibits employer contributions,70 requires that the plan be professionally managed,71 and
requires that fees be low.72
Unlike the California and Illinois laws, the Oregon Act does not expressly exempt employers of a minimum size.73 The Oregon Act is further
distinguished from the California and Illinois laws in that it does not explicitly call for the creation of IRAs. Instead, it calls for the creation of a defined
contribution plan.74 In advising the Oregon Board, however, the Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College (“CRR”) has said that Oregon must
decide which type of IRA to use in its program and has recommended the
Roth IRA.75

63

OR. REV. STAT. § 178.200(1) (2015).
Id. at § 178.205(1).
65 Id. at § 178.205(2).
66 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 3(1)(b) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 178.210(1)(b) (2015)) (stating a “qualified retirement plan” is defined to include “a plan qualified under
section 401(a), section 401(k), section 403(a), section 403(b), section 408(k), section 408(p), or section
457(b) of the Internal Revenue Code”).
67 Id. at § 3(1)(c).
68 Id. at § 3(1)(d).
69 Id. at § 3(1)(e).
70 Id. § 3(1)(h).
71 Id. § 3(1)(m).
72 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 3(1)(q) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 178.210 (2015)).
73 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 2(1) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §
178.205 (2015)).
74 Id.
75 Memorandum from Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College, to Or. Ret. Sav. Plan (May 22,
2016), https://www.oregon.gov/treasury/ORSP/Documents/CRR%20Memo%20%20Roth%20vs%20C
onventional%20IRA%201JUNE16%20-%20BC.pdf. For a discussion of the distinctions between traditional and Roth IRAs and their implications for state automatic enrollment IRA programs, see Kathryn L.
64
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ARE STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRA PROGRAMS “EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS” UNDER ERISA

Originally enacted in 1974, and amended multiple times since then, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) regulates
“employee benefit plans.”76 Among other things, it imposes reporting and
disclosure requirements,77 vesting78 and funding79 rules, and fiduciary provisions80 to protect plan participants.
Section 4(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA generally applies to any
“employee benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer “engaged
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or any plan
established or maintained by unions representing employees engaged in commerce.81 Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”82 Thus, if
state automatic enrollment IRA programs are viewed as creating employee
benefit plans, ERISA will preempt the state law creating the programs and
the law may not be enforced.
In light of the importance of this issue, the Illinois Act directs the Illinois
Board to request a determination from the Department of Labor as to the
applicability of ERISA to the Program83 and prohibits the Board from implementing the Illinois Program “if it is determined that the Program is an employee benefit plan and State or employer liability is established under the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act.”84 The California Act
contains a similar admonishment.85
On May 18, 2015, twenty-six U.S. Senators, including the ranking
members of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
and the Senate Finance Committee, sent a letter to President Barack Obama
encouraging the President to take action as soon as possible to facilitate state
Moore, A Closer Look at the IRAs in State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs, 23 CONN. INS. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016-2017).
76 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012)) [hereinafter ERISA].
77 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1021–25 (2012).
78 Id. § 1053.
79 Id. §§ 1081–85.
80 Id. §§ 1101–14.
81 Id. § 1003(a).
82 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
83 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 § 95 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/95 (2015)). (“The Board shall request in writing an opinion or ruling from the appropriate
entity with jurisdiction over the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act regarding the applicability of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act to the Program.”).
84 Id.
85 The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 § 3 (codified
as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043 (2012)).
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automatic IRA programs.86 Among other things, the Senators requested that
the President ask the Department of Labor to clarify that the California, Illinois, and similar programs are not “plans” subject to ERISA.87
At a White House Conference on Aging on July 13, 2015, President
Obama announced that states would have clarity on the issue by the end of
2015.88 That same day, referring to President Obama’s directive,89 Secretary
of Labor Perez announced that the Department of Labor would issue guidance that would “safeguard worker retirement savings and offer pathways for
states to adopt retirement savings programs that are consistent with federal
law.”90 The Department of Labor released the promised guidance on November 18, 2015 by proposing a regulation creating a new safe harbor.91 The proposed safe harbor was modestly amended and finalized in a final regulation
published on August 30, 2016.92
A.

ERISA’s Definition of Employee Benefit Plan

Section 3(3) of ERISA defines an “employee benefit plan” as an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan
which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension
benefit plan.”93 Section 3(2)(A), in turn, defines an “employee pension benefit plan” in relevant part as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund,
or program—
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
86 Letter from Senator Patty Murray et al., S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions & S.
Comm. on Fin., to President Barack Obama (May 18, 2015).
87 Id.
88 Hazel Bradford, Clarity on State-Run Private-Sector Retirement Savings Coming by Year-End,
BUS. INS. (July 14, 2015), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20150714/NEWS03/150719940.
89 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The White House Conference on Aging (July 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/13/fact-sheetwhite-house-conference-aging.
90 Tom Perez, Clearing a Path for State-Based Retirement Plans, DEP’T. OF LABOR BLOG (July 13,
2015), http://blog.dol.gov/2015/07/13/clearing-a-path-for-state-based-retirement-plans/.
91 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006 (Nov. 18, 2015) (proposing a regulation that would establish safe harbor excluding from the definition of plan under ERISA certain payroll deduction savings programs, including automatic enrollment);
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate Plans Covered by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936 (Nov. 18, 2015).
92 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510).
93 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012).
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(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating
the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating benefits under the plan
or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.94

B.

Express Exemptions Under Section ERISA § 4(b)

Section 4(b) of ERISA expressly exempts five types of plans from
ERISA: (1) governmental plans, (2) church plans, (3) plans established to
comply with workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, or disability insurance laws, (4) plans maintained outside the United States primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens, and (5) funded excess benefit plans.95
State automatic enrollment IRA programs are clearly not church plans,96
plans established to comply with workers’ compensation, unemployment
compensation, or disability insurance laws, plans maintained outside the
United States primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens,97 or funded excess benefit plans.98
Superficially, state automatic enrollment IRA programs might appear to
be “governmental plans” because they are enacted by state legislatures. Section 3(32) of ERISA, however, defines a “governmental plan” as a plan established for governmental employees.99 Because these state programs are
established to cover private-sector employees100 rather than state employees,

94

Id. at § 1002(2)(a).
Id. at § 1003(b)(1)–(5).
96 Cf. id. at § 1002(33)(A), (B) (defining church plan as a plan “established and maintained” by a
church for its employees). For a detailed discussion of the church plan exception, see David Pratt, Church
Pension Plans, in N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Alvin D. Lurie ed.,
LexisNexis 2015).
97 Cf., e.g., Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2016) (defining “employee” as “any individual who is 18 years of age or older, who is employed by an employer, and
who has wages that are allocable to Illinois during a calendar year under the provisions of Section
304(a)(2)(B) of the Illinois Income Tax Act.”).
98 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36) (“‘[E]xcess benefit plan’ means a plan maintained by an employer
solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by [I.R.C. § 415] . . . .”).
99 Id. § 1002(32).
100 Cf. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d) (West 2013) (excluding governmental employers from definition of eligible employers subject to the Act); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2016) (defining employers
subject to the Act as “a person or entity engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other enterprise in Illinois, whether for profit or not for profit” that employs 25 or more employees, has been in
business for at least two years and does not otherwise provide a tax-favored retirement savings plan to its
employees); Id. at § 80/10 (establishing the program “for the purpose of promoting greater retirement
savings for private-sector employees in a convenient, low-cost, and portable manner”).
95
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they are not “governmental plans” expressly exempt from ERISA under
ERISA § 4(b).101
Thus, state automatic enrollment IRA programs are not expressly exempt from ERISA under any of ERISA’s five statutory exemptions.
C.

Regulatory Safe Harbors

The Department of Labor has long provided regulatory safe harbors exempting certain types of arrangements from the definition of plan under
ERISA. Prior to November 2015, the regulations expressly identified six
types of plans, funds, and programs which do not constitute employee pension benefit plans for purposes of ERISA: (1) severance pay plans, (2) bonus
programs, (3) individual retirement accounts, (4) gratuitous payments to preERISA retirees, (5) tax sheltered annuities, and (6) supplemental payment
plans.102
State automatic enrollment IRA programs clearly do not fall within five
of the six regulatory safe harbors. Specifically, they do not qualify as severance pay plans, bonus programs, gratuitous payments to pre-ERISA retirees,
tax sheltered annuities, or supplemental payment plans.
Whether the state programs fall within the regulatory safe harbor for
individual retirement accounts, was a hotly debated question prior to November 2015. In November 2015, the Department of Labor issued a proposed
regulation. The preamble to the proposed regulation clarified that in the Department’s view, state automatic enrollment IRA programs do not qualify for
the safe harbor for individual retirement account.103 The proposed regulation,
however, proposed a seventh safe harbor for savings arrangements established by states for non-governmental employees.104 The new safe harbor was
modestly amended and finalized on August 31, 2016.105

101 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4(b), 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §1003(b) (2012)); See also Dorn, supra note 7, at 223 (concluding that state automatic enrollment IRA programs like the Illinois program were not “governmental plans”
exempt from ERISA because they do not cover a governmental entity’s employees).
102 Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(a)–(g) (2015).
103 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,008 (Nov. 18, 2015).
104 Id. at 72,009.
105 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
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Overview of the Regulatory Safe Harbor for IRAs

The Department of Labor regulations provide that an individual retirement account under IRC § 408(a) will not constitute a “pension plan” for
purposes of ERISA if four requirements are satisfied:
(i) No contributions are made by the employer or employee association;
(ii) Participation is completely voluntary for employees or members;
(iii) The sole involvement of the employer or employee organization is without endorsement to permit the sponsor to publicize the program to employees or members,
to collect contributions through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit
them to the sponsor; and
(iv) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form
of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable compensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.106

In 1999, the Department of Labor issued an interpretive bulletin clarifying “the circumstances under which an employer may facilitate employees’
voluntary contributions to IRAs by providing an IRA payroll deduction program without . . . inadvertently establishing or maintaining an employee pension benefit plan within the scope of section 3(2) of ERISA.”107
Interpretive Bulletin 99-1 clarifies that an employer will not be viewed
as endorsing an IRA so long as it maintains neutrality with respect to the IRA
sponsor in communications with its employees.108 The employer may provide
its employees with information about the program and encourage its employees to save, but it must make clear to its employees that its involvement is
limited to collecting the deducted amounts and promptly remitting them to
the IRA sponsor. The employer must make it clear that it does not provide
any additional benefits or promise any particular return on any investment.109
The Interpretive Bulletin also clarifies that an employer may limit the
number of IRA sponsors to which employees may make payroll deduction
contributions. But, any limitations on or costs or assessments associated with
an employee’s ability to transfer or roll over IRA contributions to another
IRA sponsor must be fully disclosed before the employee decides to participate in the program.110 Furthermore, the employer may not negotiate to obtain
special terms for its employees that are not generally available and may not
exercise any influence over the investments made or permitted by the IRA
sponsor.111
106

29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d).
Interpretive Bulletin 99-1, Payroll Deduction Programs for Individual Retirement Accounts, 64
Fed. Reg. 33,000, 33,001 (June 18, 1999) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
108 Id. at 33,002.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
107
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State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs and the IRA Regulatory Safe Harbor

State automatic enrollment IRA programs can easily satisfy three of the
four requirements. First, they can prohibit employer contributions.112 Second,
the programs can limit the employers’ involvement to educating employees
about the program and enrolling them,113 collecting employees’ contributions
through payroll deduction, and remitting contributions to the program’s
fund.114 Finally, the programs can easily provide language that prohibits compensation for employers in excess of reimbursement for the cost of rendering
services to the program.115
Prior to November 2015, there was considerable debate as to whether
state automatic enrollment IRA programs could satisfy the fourth requirement that employee participation be “completely voluntary.”116 Neither the
regulation nor the Interpretive Bulletin expressly address the question of
whether a state automatic enrollment IRA with an opt-out feature satisfies
the “completely voluntary” requirement, and no other binding authority answered the question.117 Some commentators argued that a state law that requires automatic enrollment with an opt-out feature should be considered
112

See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/65 (2016) (providing for employee contributions to be deducted through payroll deductions and not authorizing employer contributions). Indeed, recognizing that
employer contributions are not possible under current federal law, the Act’s lead sponsor, Illinois Senator
Daniel Bliss, has said that he would like to see future reforms to allow employer contributions to increase
the savings rate. Josh Barro, Illinois Will Introduce Automatic Retirement Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2015, at B3. The Oregon program prohibits employer contributions. OR. REV. STAT. § 178.210(1)(h)
(2015). The California program authorizes employer contributions, but provides that they are only permitted if they would not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan under ERISA. CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 100012(k) (West 2013).
113 See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(a) (directing participating employers to supply employees
with information packet about Program); Id. at § 80/60(a), (b) (directing employer to establish payroll
deposit retirement savings arrangement and automatically enroll employees who do not opt out of participation).
114 See, e.g., id. at § 80/65 (requiring employers to use payroll deposit savings arrangements to collect employee contributions and pay them to the Fund).
115 Cf. id. at § 80/30(m) (directing Board to make provision for the payment of administrative costs
and expenses for the creation, management, and operation of the program and cross-referencing eight
different types of administrative costs and expenses, none of which include reimbursement of employer’s
expenses for participating in program).
116 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii) (2016); Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006, 72,008 (Nov. 18, 2015).
117 Cf. Hearing on State-Required Automatic Enrollment IRA Arrangement Before the Conn. Ret.
Sec. Bd. 4 (Conn. Feb. 4, 2015) (testimony of Brian H. Graff, American Society of Pension Professionals
and Actuaries) (“ASPPA, [National Association of Plan Advisors, and National Tax-Deferred Savings
Association] are not aware of legal guidance that directly addresses whether a payroll deduction IRA that
includes an automatic enrollment with opt out design will trigger employee benefit plan status under
ERISA.”).
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“completely voluntary” for purposes of the safe harbor for IRAs.118 Other
commentators were less sanguine.119
Finally, in November 2015, the Department of Labor clarified that, in
its view, automatic enrollment with an opt-out provision does not satisfy the
completely voluntary requirement. In the preamble to the proposed regulation, the Department of Labor explained that it intended the term completely
voluntary “to mean considerably more than that employees are free to opt out
of participation in the program. Instead, the employee’s enrollment must be
self-initiated.”120 According to the preamble, the completely voluntary
condition is important because where the employer is acting on his or her own volition to provide the benefit program, the employer’s actions—e.g., requiring an automatic enrollment arrangement—would constitute its ‘establishment’ of a plan
within the meaning of ERISA’s text, and trigger ERISA’s protections for the employee whose money is deposited into an IRA.121

In the preamble to the final regulation issued in August 2016, the Department
of Labor confirmed that it intended the term completely voluntary to mean
self-initiated by the employee and that, in its view, state automatic enrollment
IRA programs that provide for automatic enrollment do not satisfy the completely voluntary requirement even if employees are permitted to opt out of
participation.122 Thus, according to the Department of Labor, state automatic
enrollment IRA programs do not qualify as “completely voluntary” under the
safe harbor for IRAs.123

118 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure Choice
Savings Program Act, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 181 (2016) (“A straightforward reading of the relevant
DOL regulation indicates that employees’ participation in the Illinois plan is ‘completely voluntary’ since
employees may readily and without penalty leave the Illinois plan or may modify their respective contribution levels.”) (footnotes omitted); MORSE, supra note 17, at 10 (“Since the employee was not required
to contribute and could opt out at any time, participation should be considered voluntary.”); Graff, supra
note 117, at 4 (“[S]o long as employees have a reasonable opportunity to opt out [from participation],
enrollment should still be considered voluntary . . . because the employee still controls whether or not to
participate.”).
119 E.g., Dorn, supra note 7, at 224 (“[I]t is generally thought that the inclusion of an automatic
enrollment feature results in employer involvement in excess of that allowed under the safe harbor.”).
120 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. at
72,008.
121 Id.
122 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,465 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
123 Id.
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Proposed Safe Harbor for Savings Arrangements Established by
States for Non-Governmental Employees

Recognizing that the situation is very different when the state government, rather than the employer, sets the terms and administers the program,
the Department of Labor proposed a new safe harbor for savings arrangements established by states for non-governmental employees.124 The proposed safe harbor replaced the “completely voluntary” standard for employer-sponsored IRAs with a “voluntary” standard for state automatic enrollment IRA programs.125 In addition, it imposed eleven other conditions that
a state program must satisfy in order to fall within the safe harbor. The conditions were intended to assure that the employer’s involvement in the program is limited to the ministerial tasks required to implement the program
under state law.126 In addition, the conditions were intended to give employees meaningful control over their IRAs and sufficient freedom not to enroll
or to discontinue their participation in the program.127
Specifically, the proposed safe harbor provided that for purposes of Title I of ERISA, the terms “employee pension benefit plan” and “pension
plan” do not include an IRA established and maintained pursuant to a state
payroll deduction savings program if the program satisfies the following requirements:
(i) The program is established by a State pursuant to State law;
(ii) The program is administered by the State establishing the program, or by a governmental agency or instrumentality of the State, which is responsible for investing
the employee savings or for selecting investment alternatives for employees to
choose;
(iii) The State assumes responsibility for the security of payroll deductions and employee savings;
(iv) The State adopts measures to ensure that employees are notified of their rights
under the program, and creates a mechanism for enforcement of those rights;
(v) Participation in the program is voluntary for employees;
(vi) The program does not require that an employee or beneficiary retain any portion
of contributions or earnings in his or her IRA and does not otherwise impose any
restrictions on withdrawals or impose any cost or penalty on transfers or rollovers
permitted under the Internal Revenue Code;
(vii) All rights of the employee, former employee, or beneficiary under the program
are enforceable only by the employee, former employee, or beneficiary, an authorized representative of such person, or by the State (or the designated governmental
agency or instrumentality . . .);
(viii) The involvement of the employer is limited to the following:
A) Collecting employee contributions through payroll deductions, and remitting
them to the program;

124

Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. at

72,009.
125

Id.
Id.
127 Id.
126
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B) Providing notice to the employees and maintaining records regarding the employer’s collection and remittance of payments under program;
C) Providing information to the State (or designated governmental agency or
instrumentality..) necessary to facilitate the operation of the program; and
D) Distributing program information to employees from the State (or designated
governmental agency or instrumentality..) and permitting the State or such entity to publicize the program to employees;
(ix) The employer contributes no funds to the program and provides no bonus or
other monetary incentive to employees to participate in the program;
(x) The employer’s participation in the program is required by State law;
(xi) The employer has no discretionary authority, control, or responsibility under the
program; and
(xii) The employer receives no direct or indirect consideration in the form of cash
or otherwise, other than the reimbursement of the actual costs of the program to the
employer of the activities [permitted in paragraph (8) above].128

The proposed regulation further provided that a state automatic enrollment IRA program will not be treated as failing to meet the safe harbor
merely because it:
(i) Is directed toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other
workplace savings arrangement;
(ii) Utilizes one or more service or investment providers to operate and administer
the program so long as the state or other designated authority retains full responsibility for the operation and administration of the program; or
(iii) Treats employees as having automatically elected to participate in the program
at the program’s default rates, including automatic increases in contributions, as
specified under state law until the employee specifically opts out or makes a different election provided that the employee is given adequate notice of the right to make
such elections.129

4.

Reactions to the Proposed Safe Harbor

More than sixty-seven comment letters were submitted in response to
the proposed safe harbor.130 Not surprisingly, reactions were mixed. Entities
with a vested interest in the current system were generally critical.131 Among
128

Id. at 72,014.
Id.
130 The Department of Labor’s website identifies 67 different comment letters. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
Employee Benefits Security Administration, Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non- Governmental Employees—Proposed Rule, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB71.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2016). One comment refers to form letters received from 14 individuals. See Fourteen Individuals—Illinois, Comment Letters on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States
for
Non-Governmental
Purposes
(Dec.
2015)
(RIN
1210-AB71,
Comment
#2),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB71.html.
131 See, e.g., Lisa J. Bleier, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Assoc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016)
(RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #29), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00006.pdf; Miriam Lohmann, Standard Ret.
129

2016]

CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP

53

other things, they argued that it was contrary to the Congressional intent of
ERISA132 and could create an uneven playing field for the private-sector.133
In contrast, entities or individuals representing the states tended to be
more supportive.134 Nevertheless, the states requested amendments or “clarifications” to six of the twelve requirements of the proposed safe harbor. Specifically, the states requested that the requirement that state law mandate participation in the state program be eliminated, or at least softened, and that the
regulation be “clarified” to (1) permit the States to delegate responsibility to
Servs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #34), at 4,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00034.pdf; David W. Blass, Inv. Co. Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN
1210-AB71, Comment #62), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00062.pdf.
132 See, e.g., Catherine J. Weatherford, Insured Ret. Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN
1210-AB71, Comment #40), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00040.pdf; Amanda Austin, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #40),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00046.pdf; Blass, supra note 131, at 2.
133 See, e.g., Defined Contribution Inst. Inv. Assoc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding
Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN
1210-AB71, Comment #30), at 4, 6, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00030.pdf; Gary A. Sanders, Nat’l Assoc. of
Ins. & Fin. Advisors, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by
States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #35), at 2,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/
public-comments/1210-AB71/00035.pdf; Tim Rouse, The SPARK Inst., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan.
19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #50), at 9, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/
ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00050.pdf.
134 See, e.g., Ted Wheeler, Ore. Ret. Sav. Bd., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving
Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71,
Comment #54), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00054.pdf; John Chiang et al., Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd.,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #12), at 9,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00012.pdf; Kevin Lembo & Denise A. Nappier, Conn. Ret. Sec. Bd., Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 7, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #11), at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/
files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00013.pdf; Michael
Frerichs et al., Ill. Secure Choice Sav. Bd., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 6, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #16), at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00016.pdf.
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third parties, (2) reduce or eliminate state liability in certain instances, and
(3) loosen the restriction on withdrawals.135
5.

Final Safe Harbor for Savings Arrangements Established by
States for Non-Governmental Employees

On August 30, 2016, the Department of Labor issued a final regulation
modifying the proposed safe harbor in five ways First, the Department of
Labor added regulatory text136 to make it clear that the regulation establishes
a safe harbor and does not “prohibit states from taking additional or different
action or from experimenting with other programs or arrangements.”137 Second, it eliminated the condition prohibiting states from imposing restrictions
on employees’ ability to withdraw from their IRAs.138 Third, it modified the
condition prohibiting employers from receiving compensation for more than
their actual costs of complying with state programs.139 Under the final safe
harbor, there is no need to calculate actual employer cost; instead, compensation is limited to a reasonable approximation of employer costs under the
program.140 Fourth, it modified the provision that stated that a state program
would not fail to qualify for the safe harbor because the program is “directed
toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other workplace savings arrangement.”141 It replaced that provision with a statement that
a state program would not fail to qualify for the safe harbor because it is
“directed toward those employers that do not offer some other workplace

135 E.g., John Chiang et al., Representatives from four states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, and
Oregon, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #52), https://www.dol.
gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210AB71/00052.pdf.
136 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,476 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (adding language to 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-2(a) stating that “[t]he safe harbors in this section should not be read as implicitly indicating the
Department’s views on the possible scope of section 3(2).”).
137 Id. at 59,466 (stating that “[a] safe harbor approach to these arrangements provides to states clear
guide posts and certainty, yet does not by its terms prohibit states from taking additional or different action
of from experimenting with other programs or arrangements.”).
138 See id. at 59,467 (explaining why the condition contained in paragraph (h)(1)(vi) was removed).
For a more detailed discussion of this change, see infra Section III.D.
139 Id. at 59,467–68 (explaining why the condition was modified).
140 Id. at 59,477 (providing that “[t]he employer receives no direct or indirect consideration in the
form of cash or otherwise, other than consideration (including tax incentives and credits) received directly
from the State (or governmental agency or instrumentality of the State) that does not exceed an amount
that reasonably approximates the employer’s (or a typical employer’s) costs under the program.”) (to be
codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(xi)).
141 Id. at 59,468.
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savings arrangement.”142 Finally, it amended language to clarify that as long
as a program is specifically established under state law, the program can qualify for the safe harbor even if a wide array of implementation and administrative authority is delegated to a board, committee, authority, office, or similar governmental agency or instrumentality.143
III. ARE STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRAS THE ANSWER TO THE
RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP?
Relying on the insights from behavioral economics, proponents of automatic enrollment IRA programs contend that automatic enrollment IRAs
are an answer, or at least a partial answer, to increasing retirement savings in
this country. Advocates of the programs note that participation rates are much
higher in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans than in traditional 401(k) plans,
and expect that those results would be replicated in automatic enrollment IRA
programs.144
Determining whether state automatic enrollment IRAs would fill the retirement savings gap, however, is not as simple as looking at the participation
rates in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans and concluding that they will necessarily increase retirement savings. Instead, how effective the programs
would be depends on the answers to two fundamental questions: (1) Will
workers be covered by these programs; and (2) If workers are covered by
these programs, will they lead to adequate retirement savings? The answers
to those two questions, in turn, depend on the answers to a host of subsidiary
and sometimes overlapping questions, including: (1) How many states will
establish state automatic IRA programs?; (2) Who will be covered by these
programs?; (3) How many covered employees will opt out?; (4) How expensive will the plans to be to administer?; (5) Will participants’ interests be
adequately protected under the state programs?; (6) Will employers shift
from existing private-sector plans with higher limits and matching contributions to state automatic enrollment IRAs with lower limits and no matching
provisions?; and finally (7) Will the plans be preempted by ERISA?

142

Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(2)(i)). For a discussion of this
amendment, see infra Section III.G.3.c.
143 Id. The proposed regulation was unclear and inconsistent as to the specific meaning and role of
the States. See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed.
Reg. 72,006, 72,009 (Nov. 18, 2015) (stating in part that State “in the proposed regulation has the same
meaning as in Title 1 of ERISA,” but then going on to say “[t]he state must also administer the program
either directly or through a governmental agency or other instrumentality.”). The final regulation clarifies
the States’ role, declaring that “State (or other governmental agency or instrumentality of the State)” will
be used throughout the final regulation. See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016).
144 E.g., John Chiang et al., Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3.
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This section does not, and cannot, offer a definitive answer to these
questions. It does, however, offer insights on how the questions might be
answered and the many interrelated issues they raise.
A.

How Many States Will Establish State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs?

In order for state automatic enrollment IRAs programs to fill the retirement savings gap, states must, of course, enact such programs. It is not clear,
however, how many states will elect to establish them.
First, not all states are interested in establishing an automatic enrollment
IRA program. For example, some states, such as Washington145 and New Jersey,146 have decided to use a “marketplace approach”147 rather than automatic
enrollment IRAs to increase retirement savings. Second, although a number
of states have enacted legislation studying and/or creating automatic enrollment IRA programs, the question of whether such programs qualify as employees benefit plans subject to ERISA has been a major stumbling block to

145 For a discussion of the political maneuvering that led to the Washington marketplace, see Denmark, supra note 5.
146 See Leslie A. Pappas, N.J. Retirement Proposal Revamped, Headed Back to Governor’s Desk,
43 PENS. & BENEFITS REP. (BNA) 61 (Jan. 19, 2016) (noting that the New Jersey legislature originally
approved a mandatory automatic enrollment IRA program modeled after the Illinois Secure Choice program but the legislature replaced it with a market place approach after Governor Christie conditionally
vetoed the original legislation).
147 In an Interpretive Bulletin, the Department of Labor announced that a state marketplace is not
itself an employee benefit plan under ERISA and the arrangement available to employers in a marketplace
could include employee benefit plans subject to ERISA. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings
Programs That Sponsor of Facilitate Plans Covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936, 71,937 (Nov. 18, 2015). Under the marketplace approach, the state “provides
employers with education on plan availability and makes pre-screened plans available through a central
website to promote participation in low-cost, low- burden retirement plans.” ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL.,
CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE INITIATIVES TO COVER UNCOVERED
PRIVATE
SECTOR
WORKERS
5
(2016),
http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/State-Initiatives-Brief.pdf.
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the implementation of such programs.148 By creating a safe harbor, the Department of Labor has arguably facilitated the adoption of such programs by
more states and sooner than might have occurred absent the regulation.149
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how many states will implement a state
automatic enrollment IRA program under the new guidance. The Illinois
Board indicated that it could move forward with its program under the proposed safe harbor.150 The Chair of the Illinois Board and representatives and
entities from other states (“the States”), however, were less enthusiastic and
asked for a number of amendments and/or clarifications to the proposed safe
harbor’s requirements.151 Their most significant concern was the requirement
that state law mandate employer participation.152
There were two principle objections to the mandate requirement. First,
the mandate requirement prohibits voluntary state programs. Some states,
such as North Dakota,153 Utah,154 and Indiana,155 are opposed to mandatory
programs but are considering voluntary automatic enrollment IRA programs.
Second, and arguably more importantly, the mandate requirement raises significant uncertainty, and potentially significant administrative costs, for programs that mandate that some, but not all, employers participate in the program.
148

Another significant question is whether such a program is financially feasible. See, e.g., Act of
June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 7 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 178.230 (2015))
(requiring market analysis determining feasibility of plan before Oregon Retirement Savings Plan may be
established); California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 § 3 (codified
as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100042 (West 2013)) (providing that program may become operative only if board
determines, based on market analysis, that program will be self-sustaining). Studies done for California
and Connecticut show that such programs can be financially viable and self-sustaining if properly structured). See OVERTURE FINANCIAL, LLC, supra note 37, at 34; CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO
LEGISLATURE 5, 34 (2016).
149 Marti Fisher, Cal. Chamber of Commerce, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving
Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71,
Comment #60), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00060.pdf; Dory Rand, Woodstock Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan.
12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #19), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/
laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00021.pdf.
150 Frerichs et al., supra note 134, at 1.
151 Chiang et al., Representatives from four states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Oregon,
supra note 134, at 1.
152 See, e.g., Lembo & Nappier, supra note 134, at 3–4 (expressing concern that technically challenging questions that arise as a result of the mandate requirement “will derail establishment of a program”).
153 See H.B. 1200, 64th Leg. Assemb. § 1 (N.D. 2015).
154 See David C. Damschen, Utah State Treasurer, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding
Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN
1210-AB71, Comment #64), at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/
rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00064.pdf.
155 See H.B. 1279, Gen. Assemb. § 1 (Ind. 2015); S.B. 555, Gen. Assemb. § 1 (Ind. 2015).
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For example, the California Program only mandates that employers with
five or more employees participate;156 the Illinois Program mandate only applies to employers with twenty-five or more employees.157 The mandate requirement raises significant issues for employers with a fluctuating workforce. For example, an Illinois employer may have twenty-five employees
one year, and the following year, the employer may only have twenty-three
employees. What must the employer do? May its employees who were enrolled in the program the preceding year remain in the program on an opt-out
basis? Must they be shifted to an opt-in basis? Must their participation be
terminated? What happens if the employer, not realizing it is no longer subject to the mandate, inadvertently enrolls a new employee in the program on
an opt-out basis? On a related note, what happens if an employer intentionally enrolls its employees in the program on an opt-out basis even though the
employer knows that it is not subject to the mandate?
The States asked that the Department of Labor eliminate the mandate
requirement in order to avoid these issues or, at a minimum, provide clear
guidance on how these issues would be resolved.158
In its explanation of the proposed safe harbor, the Department of Labor
took great pains to explain that in its view, the term “completely voluntary”
means “considerably more than that employees are free to opt-out of participation in the program.”159 According to the Department of Labor, the completely voluntary condition applicable to the traditional regulatory safe harbor for IRAs is important because the employer “establishes” a plan within
the meaning of ERISA when the employer, acting on its own volition, provides the benefit program.160
In providing a looser “voluntary” standard for state programs, the Department of Labor explained that “[w]here states require employers to offer
savings arrangements, undue employer influence or pressure to enroll is far
less of a concern. Moreover, the state’s active involvement and the limitations on the employers’ role removes the employer from the equation” so that
156

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d) (West 2013).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2015).
158 The Illinois and California commenters were far from the only commenters to request that the
employer mandate be eliminated. Indeed, requesting that the employer mandate be either eliminated or
softened was one of the most frequent comments made to the Department of Labor in response to the
proposed regulation. Chiang et al., Representatives from four states—California, Connecticut, Illinois,
and Oregon, supra note 134, at 2; Frerichs et al., supra note 134, at 1. Only one commenter, the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, expressly opposed expansion to voluntary participation. Shaun C. O’Brien, AFL-CIO, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #36), at 5, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00036.pdf.
159 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,008 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015).
160 Id.
157
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the arrangement is not “established or maintained” by the employer as required under ERISA’s definition of employee benefit plan.161
In response to the Department of Labor’s reasoning, the California
Board asserted that as long as an employer has no discretion in choosing investments, default contribution rates, the IRA custodian, and similar elements of the program, an employer who voluntarily joins a state program is
no more able to influence employee choice than an employer subject to a
mandate. Moreover, there is no reason why an employer who voluntarily
chooses to join a state program would want to unduly influence its employees
to participate in the program. Most significantly, employees would not be
subject to any greater risk from the employer’s activities if the employer voluntarily decided to join a program than if the employer were required to participate in the program.162
Although the California Board made a strong argument that the Department of Labor could have and should have dropped its requirement that participation in state automatic enrollment IRA programs be mandatory, the Department declined to do so. The final safe harbor retains the mandate requirement.163
In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department of Labor provided some clarity on how the mandate is to be applied. The Department
stated that the administrative difficulties raised by the states in their comments were a result of the operation of a particular state law and were a matter
for the states to address.164 According to the Department, a state law with a
small employer exemption could require that an employer, once subject to a
mandate, remain subject to it without regard to future changes in workforce
size.165 Or, the Department noted, a state might require an employer to maintain payroll deductions for employees who were enrolled when the employer
was subject to the requirement, but not for new employees until the workforce again reaches the threshold size for coverage.166
The Department of Labor announced that if an employer that ceases to
be subject to a state mandate continues to make payroll deductions or automatically enroll new participants, the employer would be acting outside of
the boundaries of the safe harbor.167 This is because the employers’ continued

161

Id. at 72,009.
Chiang et al., Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 4–5. The California Secure
Choice Retirement Savings Investment Board also distinguished the cases and materials the Department
of Labor cited in footnote 12 in support of its contention that opt-out arrangements are not “completely
voluntary” for purposes of the traditional IRA safe harbor.
163 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,470 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510(h)(1)(x)).
164 Id. at 59,471.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
162
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participation in the program would be a voluntary decision to provide benefits pursuant to a particular plan, fund, or program, and thus the employer
would be establishing an ERISA-covered plan.168
The Department further noted that if a state allows, but does not require,
an exempted small employer to participate in the state program, the employer
might be able to do so without creating a plan subject to ERISA if the employer satisfies the requirements for the IRA payroll deduction safe harbor.169
In order to satisfy that safe harbor, among other things, employees must affirmatively consent to payroll deductions and the employer may not automatically enroll the employees in the program.170
Finally, the Department noted that if an employer establishes its own
ERISA-covered plan under a state program, that plan would be subject to
ERISA’s requirements.171 Generally, the employer would be considered the
“plan sponsor” and “administrator” for purposes of ERISA.172 The establishment of an ERISA plan by one employer, however, would not affect the
availability of the safe harbor for other participating employers.173
Although the Department of Labor did not eliminate the mandate requirement, it did provide some clarity on how the mandate requirement is to
be applied. In light of this guidance, it is likely that those states that have
already introduced automatic enrollment IRA programs will move forward
with their programs. In addition, some other states, and perhaps even some
cities,174 may introduce such programs. It is highly unlikely, however, that all
states will enact state automatic enrollment IRA programs. In sum, it is not
entirely how many states will enact such programs.
B.

Who Will Be Covered?

State automatic enrollment IRA programs are intended to address the
retirement savings gap by providing a retirement savings vehicle for individuals who do not have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan.175 Thus,
168

Id.
Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,471 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 On the day the Department of Labor finalized the safe harbor, it proposed expanding the safe
harbor to cover “qualified political subdivisions.” Savings Arrangements Established by States for NonGovernmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,471 (Aug. 30, 2016).
175 Individuals who are not covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan are eligible to receive
favorable income tax treatment for retirement savings if they participate in an IRA. As a practical matter,
however, few individuals contribute to IRAs outside the employment context. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS, HOW STATES ARE WORKING TO ADDRESS THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS CHALLENGE: AN
169
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how successful the programs are likely to be necessarily depends, in part, on
whether they will cover those individuals who currently do not have access
to an employer-sponsored pension plan.
It can be difficult to identify precisely how many workers do not have
access to an employer-sponsored pension plan. Estimates of pension plan access and participation rates vary across data sources. For example, according
to a recent study by The Pew Charitable Trusts, 58 percent of full-time, fullyear private-sector workers between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four have
access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan while 49 percent participate
in one.176 In contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 76 percent of
full-time private-sector workers have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan while 59 percent participate in one.177 The variations in the data are
due, in part, to methodological differences, such as the make-up of the underlying sample and the way in which questions are phrased.178 In addition,
research suggests that individuals responding to surveys tend to underreport
access and participation rates compared to data as reported on W-2 forms.179
Despite the discrepancies, it is clear that a sizeable portion of the U.S.
working population does not currently have access to an employer-sponsored
pension plan. Drs. Constanijin Panis and Michael Brien prepared a study
identifying the target populations of the California and Illinois Secure Choice
Programs.180 They found that the California Secure Choice Program should
cover about 7.8 million workers who are not currently covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan,181 while the Illinois Secure Choice Program

ANALYSIS OF STATE-SPONSORED INITIATIVES TO HELP PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS SAVE

1-2 (June 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/06/howstatesareworkingtoaddress
theretirementsavingschallange.pdf.
176 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO’S IN, WHO’S OUT: A LOOK AT ACCESS TO EMPLOYER-BASED
RETIREMENT PLANS AND PARTICIPATION IN THE STATES 1–2 (Jan. 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
~/media/assets/2016/01/retirement_savings_report_jan16.pdf (based on data from pooled version of
2010-14 Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement).
177 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United
States—March 2015 (July 24, 2015), at 5, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf (based on data
from National Compensation Survey).
178 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO’S IN, WHO’S OUT, supra note 176, at 2.
179 See Irena Dushi et al., Assessment of Retirement Plan Coverage by Firm Size, Using W-2 Tax
Records, 71 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 53–54 (2011).
180 CONSTANTIJN W.A. PANIS & MICHAEL J. BRIEN, TARGET POPULATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL
AUTOMATIC IRA INITIATIVES 1 (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/researchers/
analysis/retirement/targetpopulationsofstatelevelautomaticirainitiatives.pdf.
181 Id. at 6. Relying on the U.C. Berkeley estimates, Overture Financial, LLC found in its feasibility
study that about 6.3 million workers were potentially eligible for the California Program. Compare
OVERTURE FINANCIAL, LLC, supra note 37, at, with NARI RHEE, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RES.
& EDUC., 6.3 MILLION PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS IN CALIFORNIA LACK ACCESS TO A RETIREMENT
PLAN ON THE JOB 1-2 (2012), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2012/ca_private_pension_gap12.pdf.
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should cover about 1.7 million workers who are not covered by an employersponsored pension plan.182
Although the California and Illinois Secure Choice Programs will provide access for a significant number of workers who do not currently have
access to an employer-sponsored pension plan, they will not cover all workers who are not currently covered. First, the California and Illinois programs
only apply to employers of a minimum size. As discussed, the California
program does not apply to employers with fewer than five employees and the
Illinois program does not apply to employers with fewer than twenty-five
employees.183 Based on these thresholds, Drs. Panis and Brien estimate that
the California program excludes about 1.8 million individuals who work at
firms with between one and four employees,184 and the Illinois program excludes about 1.2 million individuals who work at firms with fewer than
twenty-five employees.185
In addition, the California, Illinois, and Oregon programs exempt employers that offer an employer-sponsored pension plan.186 At first blush, this
exemption might seem to be irrelevant: if an employer offers a pension plan,
then its employees must have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan.
In fact, however, employers that offer pension plans do not always permit all
employees to participate in the plan. For example, employers often exclude
part-time workers from participating in their pension plans.187

182

PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 180, at 12.
Daniel Bliss, the sponsor of the Illinois legislation, would have liked the program to apply to even
smaller employers. He described the twenty-five employee floor as an especially painful concession to
the financial industry. See Denmark, supra note 5.
184 PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 180, at 6 tbl.5.
185 Id. at 12 tbl.16.
186 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2015) (defining employer); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d), (f)
(West 2013) (excluding from mandate employers that offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan or
automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.210(1)(b), 178.215(8) (2015) (exempting employers that offer qualified plans).
187 In order to receive favorable income tax treatment, a “qualified” employer-sponsored pension
plan must satisfy a host of qualification requirements set forth in section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. Among the qualification requirements are requirements that the plan not discriminate against nonhighly compensated employees in coverage or benefits. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)–(4) (2015). The nondiscrimination rules limit an employer’s ability to exclude workers from its plan. The nondiscrimination rules,
however, do not prohibit employers from excluding some workers from their plans. For example, the
nondiscrimination rules permit employers to exclude part-time employees, defined as those who work less
than 1,000 hours per year, or about 20 hours per week, in determining whether the plan satisfies the nondiscrimination requirements. I.R.C. § 410(b)(4)(A) (2015). In addition, the nondiscrimination rules do not
require employers to cover all employees. They simply require that employers cover a sufficient number
of non-highly compensated employees relative to the number of highly compensated employees covered
by the plan. The nondiscrimination rules applicable to qualified plans are among the most complex and
technical rules in all of tax law. For an overview of the rules, see, for example, KATHRYN L. MOORE,
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW ch. 9 (2015).
183
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Unfortunately, data on the number of employees who work for an employer that offers a plan but who are not eligible to participate in the plan is
not readily available. The surveys generally distinguish between whether an
employer offers a pension plan and whether an employee participates in a
plan.188 The surveys, however, do not use a uniform definition of participation,189 and more importantly, they do not distinguish between employees
who choose not to participate in a plan and employees who are not eligible
to participate in the plan.190 Thus, due to data limitations, it is not clear exactly
how many workers the California and Illinois Secure Choice Programs would
not cover because the workers’ employer offers a pension plan even though
the workers are ineligible to participate. Nevertheless, it is clear that some
number of workers will be excluded because their employer offers a plan
even though they are not eligible to participate in the plan.191
In theory, a state automatic enrollment IRA program could cover employees of an employer who are excluded from their employer’s plan.192 For
188 See, e.g., RHEE, supra note 181, at 15 (noting that Current Population Survey asks two questions
about pension plan coverage: (1) whether employer offered a pension plan, and (2) whether employee
participated in the plan).
189 See John Turner et al., Defining Participation in Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 126
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 36–37 (2003) (describing three different definitions of participation used in
empirical studies); Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF no. 405 (Emp’t Benefit Research Inst.), Oct. 2014, at 8
(“[d]efining the ‘[c]orrect’ [r]etirement [p]articipation [l]evel”).
190 Cf. Copeland, supra note 189, at 8 (recognizing importance in distinction between percentage of
workforce participating in plan and percentage of eligible workforce participating in plan and using terms
“participation level” or “percentage participating” rather than “participation rate” to refer to former).
191 Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey: Retirement benefits: Access, Participation, and Take-Up Rates (Mar. 2014), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/
2014/ownership/civilian/table02a.htm (reporting that among civilian workers, 78 percent of full-time
workers compared to 37 percent of part-time workers have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan
and 64 percent of full-time workers and 21 percent of part-time workers participate in such plans); Peter
Brady & Michael Bogdan, Who Gets Retirement Plans and Why, 2013, ICI RES. PERSP., Oct. 2014, at 6
(“60 percent of employees who worked full-time for a full year reported that their employer sponsored a
retirement plan in 2013, compared with 26 percent of workers who worked part-time for part of the year.”).
192 The proposed regulation made it clear that a state automatic enrollment IRA could cover employees of an employer who are excluded from the employer’s plan by providing that a state automatic enrollment IRA program would not be treated as failing to meet the proposed safe harbor merely because it was
“directed toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other workplace savings arrangements.” Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). The final regulation amended that provision to state that a state automatic enrollment IRA program will not fail to satisfy the safe harbor merely
because it is “directed toward those employers that do not offer some other workplace savings arrangement.” Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). The preamble to the regulation explains
that the Department amended the language in response to comments that the provision “could encourage
states to focus on whether particular employees of an employer are eligible to participate in a workplace
savings arrangement” and such a focus could be overly burdensome for certain employers. Id. The Department stated that the amended language “will reduce employer involvement in determining employee
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example, when a Connecticut bill creating an automatic enrollment IRA program was initially introduced, it extended the program to certain workers
who were not eligible to participate in the plan offered by their employer.193
The proposed program applied to employers with plans that excluded workers who were reasonably expected to complete one thousand hours of service
in a calendar year or who had completed at least five hundred hours of service
for the employer in each of the past two consecutive years.194 The provision,
however, did not last long. A week after it was introduced, the provision was
dropped,195 presumably in response to vehement opposition the provision engendered.196
In sum, automatic enrollment IRA programs are likely to provide access
to workplace savings arrangements to some workers who would otherwise
not have access to such savings arrangements. They are, however, unlikely
to extend access to all such workers. How many workers would still be without access to workplace savings arrangements depends on the design of the
particular program.
C.

How Many Covered Employees Will Opt Out?

A host of studies show that participation rates are higher in automatic
enrollment 401(k) plans than in traditional 401(k) plans in which workers
must affirmatively elect to participate in the plan. For example, in the seminal
study on the subject, behavioral economists Briggite Madrian and Dennis
Shea found that automatic enrollment dramatically increased the participation rate of newly hired employees. Specifically, the economists found that
only 37 percent of new hires enrolled in a company’s 401(k) plan when the
company required workers to affirmatively opt in, compared to 86 percent

eligibility for the state program, and . . . accurately reflects current state law.” Id. The Department, however, did not state that the provision prohibits a state from establishing a state automatic enrollment IRA
program that covers employees excluded from an employer’s plan. Indeed, as the Department noted at the
outset of its discussion of this issue, the provision “is not a requirement or condition of the safe harbor but
is only an example of a feature that states may incorporate when designing their automatic enrollment
IRA programs.” Id.
193 CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, supra note 148, at 19–20.
194 H.B. 5591 § 7(a)(4)(B), 2016 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/
2016/TOB/h/pdf/2016HB-05591-R00-HB.pdf. See also CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO LEGISLATURE,
supra note 148, at 19–20 (“By framing the employer mandate in these terms, the legislature would provide
coverage to the growing ranks of part-time workers, many of whom work multiple part-time jobs.”).
195 Problematic Connecticut Coverage Proposal Withdrawn, NAT’L ASSOC. OF PLAN ADVISORS
(Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/legislation/problematic-connect
icut-coverage-proposal-withdrawn/?mqsc=E3829119.
196 Connecticut Retirement Security Program Act (H.B. 5591): Hearing on H.B. 5591 Before the J.
Labor & Pub. Emps. Comm., 2016 Sess. 2–3 (Conn. 2016) (statement of Andrew J. Remo, Am. Retirement Ass’n).
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when the plan was amended to provide for automatic enrollment.197 Overall,
the differential was not as dramatic as these figures suggest, as employees
with longer tenure had much higher participation rates than newly hired employees under the conventional approach.198 Nevertheless, there was still evidence indicating that automatic enrollment increases participation rates.
Subsequent studies have confirmed that automatic enrollment does indeed increase participation rates. A Prudential study found that Prudential
plans with automatic enrollment have 90 percent participation rates compared to 62 percent participation rates for plans with conventional enrollment.199 In a study based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor’s National
Compensation Survey, Barbara Butrica and Nadia Karamcheva found that
the participation rates in automatic enrollment plans were 77.1 percent compared to 67.3 percent in traditional opt-in plans.200
This evidence associated with automatic enrollment 401(k) plans lends
support to the argument that state automatic enrollment IRAs will increase
retirement savings.201 How much such programs will increase retirement sav-

197 Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation
and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1159 (2001).
198 For example, more than 80% of employees who had worked for the company for ten or more
years had enrolled in the plan under the opt-in approach. See, e.g., id. at 1163. This plan is not unique in
having participation rates increase as employees’ tenure with the firm increases. See, e.g., Julie R. Agnew
et al., Literacy, Trust and 401(k) Savings Behavior 10 n.2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working
Paper No. 2007-10, 2007) (noting that overall participation rates in voluntary 401(k) plan increased from
“38% for eligible employees with tenure of 0-1 years; 54% for eligible employees with tenure of 2-3
years; and 66% for eligible employees with tenure of 4-6 years”).
199 Veronica Charcalla & Gary Crawford, Prudential Financial, Inc., Overcoming Participant Inertia:
Automatic Features That Improve Outcomes While Improving Your Plan’s Bottom Line 6 (2015),
http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/overcoming-participant-inertia.pdf.
200 Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, Automatic Enrollment, Employee Compensation,
and Retirement Security 11, 14 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper No. 2012-25, 2012)
(noting that the “coefficient on automatic enrollment is positive and highly significant”). See also
VANGUARD GRP., INC., HOW AMERICA SAVES 2015: A REPORT ON VANGUARD 2014 DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLAN DATA 31 fig. 27 (reporting overall participation rate of 89 percent for employees in
plans with automatic enrollment feature compared to rate of 61 percent for employees hired under plans
with voluntary enrollment); J.J. McKinney, 401(k) Plans: Automatic Enrollment, 20 J. PENSION BENEFITS
60, 63 (2013) (stating that according to a study of Schwab plans, automatic enrollment plans had an average participation rate of 87.59 percent compared to 73.04 percent for conventional enrollment plans);
James J. Choi, Contributions to Defined Contribution Pension Plans 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21467, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21467.pdf (showing that only 71 percent
of workers had ever contributed to 401(k) plan by 4 years after hire under traditional opt-in enrollment
compared to 99 percent of workers under automatic enrollment).
201 See, e.g., Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3, 5. Indeed, the
architects of the original automatic enrollment IRA program, J. Mark Iwry and David John, cite to increased participation rates in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans in support of their proposed universal
automatic enrollment IRA program. J. MARK IWRY & DAVID C. JOHN, THE RET. SEC. PROJECT, PURSUING
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ings, however, depends in part on how many workers will opt out of participation. Unfortunately, there is limited data available to answer this question.202
Recognizing the dearth of evidence and the importance of the question,
the Connecticut Retirement Security Board hired the Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College to do a market analysis for a proposed automatic
enrollment IRA program.203 Specifically, the CRR was charged with answering two key questions about workers: (1) at what rate are workers likely to
opt out of the program?; and (2) how would program features likely affect
opt-out rates?204 To answer these questions, the CRR performed an online
enrollment experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to different programs with different features and asked whether they would remain
enrolled in the proposed program or opt out.205 The CRR found that approximately 19 percent of workers would opt out of the program if it had a 6 percent default contribution rate directed into a Roth IRA with a target date fund
as the default investment choice with no guaranteed returns or annuitization
at retirement.206 Opt-out rates decreased to 15.1 percent when the default contribution rate was set at 3 percent rather than 6 percent, and opt-out rates
increased to 25.1 percent when a deferred annuity was purchased at retirement.207
In another study analyzing the potential for a generic automatic enrollment IRA to increase the probability of a “successful” retirement, Jack
VanDerhei of the Employee Benefits Research Institute (“EBRI”) recognized
that there is not much detailed information on opt-out rates in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans.208 Thus, he assumed and applied a number of different
opt-out rates to determine the likely impact of a generic automatic enrollment
IRA on retirement readiness.209 He noted that EBRI is currently analyzing
data from automatic enrollment 401(k) plans without employer matches to
determine the most likely opt-out rates for such plans.210
A separate study focusing on the populations targeted by the California
and Illinois automatic enrollment IRA programs conducted by Constanijin
UNIVERSAL RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGH AUTOMATIC IRAS 3 (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/07_automatic_ira_iwry.pdf.
202 See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 4, at 1626 (noting that there is a “relative dearth of evidence” on
why workers opt out of automatic enrollment 401(k) plans in part because behavioral law and economics
scholars “have not focused on the question”).
203 Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Report on Design of Connecticut’s Retirement Security
Program 1 (2015), http://www.osc.ct.gov/crsb/meetings.html.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 32.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 VanDerhei, supra note 2, at 15.
209 Id. at 17 fig. 2.
210 Id. at 28 n.23.
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Panis and Michael Brien found that those populations tend to have lower
earnings and be younger than workers with access to an employer-sponsored
pension plan.211 Based on these characteristics, they speculated that the optout rates may be higher than in the average automatic enrollment 401(k) plan
because the targeted populations are further from retirement age and entitled
to relatively higher benefits from Social Security, and thus have weaker incentives to save for retirement.212 They did not, however, try to estimate optout rates because such an analysis was outside the scope of their study.
A separate study of Vanguard automatic enrollment 401(k) plans supports Panis and Brien’s speculation. According to the Vanguard study, optout rates are higher than average for individuals with income of less than
$30,000, and opt-out rates are higher in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans
with no employer matching contribution.213 In light of the fact that covered
employees are likely to have lower incomes and employers are prohibited
from contributing to state automatic enrollment IRA programs under the new
safe harbor, it seems likely that employees will opt out of a state automatic
enrollment IRA program at a higher rate than under the average 401(k) plan.
Finally, in a rare study focusing on why workers opt out of automatic
enrollment 401(k) plans,214 a group of economists affiliated with the CRR
asked a series of questions.215 They found two rational reasons that might
explain why some individuals elect to opt out of participating in an automatic
enrollment 401(k) plan: (1) individuals who opt out may be financially constrained, and (2) individuals who choose to opt out may be saving through
their spouse’s 401(k) plan.216 Specifically, in the survey of participants and
nonparticipants in two automatic enrollment 401(k) plans, 51 percent of
workers who opted out strongly agreed with the statement, “You can’t afford
to save in your company’s retirement savings plan,” and 49 percent of workers who opted out agreed with the statement, “My spouse/partner and I use
his/her 401(k) plan to save for retirement.”217 In addition, the economists
found two less rational explanations for why workers might opt out. They
found that individuals with low financial literacy and low trust in financial
institutions were more likely to opt out of participation than individuals with
higher levels of financial literacy and trust in financial institutions.218
211

PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 180, at 17.
Id. at i.
213 Stephen P. Utkus & Jean A. Young, Vanguard Grp., Inc., How America Saves 2016: Vanguard
2015 Defined Contribution Plan Data 29–30, 32 (2015).
214 In contrast, much attention has been focused on the question of why workers voluntarily elect to
participate in conventional 401(k) plans. See Agnew, supra note 198, at 3–8 (reviewing the literature).
215 They asked six questions specifically addressing the individuals’ reasons for participating or opting out of participation. In addition, they asked questions to gauge the individuals’ financial literacy and
trust in financial institutions. Id. at 14–15, 19, 44 tbl.10 (listing questions used to assess financial literary,
level of trust in financial institutions, and reasons for opting out of automatic enrollment plan).
216 Id. at 26.
217 Id. at 26, 44 tbl.10.
218 Id. at 2–3.
212
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Though limited, studies on the subject make it clear that some workers
are likely to opt out of participating in a state automatic enrollment IRA program. Opt-out rates appear to depend on a variety of factors, including the
program’s default contribution rate, investment options, and distribution provisions. Thus, it is hard to say exactly how many workers are likely to opt
out of participating in a particular state’s program.
D.

How Expensive Will the Plans Be to Administer?

If the states were willing to pay for the administrative costs of automatic
enrollment IRA programs, the expenses would have no impact on workers’
accumulation of retirement savings through the programs. In fact, however,
the states are unwilling to bear those costs.219 Instead, they ask the participants to bear the costs.220
If workers must bear the administrative costs, they may have a significant impact on workers’ ultimate retirement savings. To illustrate, suppose
that an individual has an account balance of $25,000 and thirty-five years
until retirement. If the individual makes no additional contributions and account earnings average 7 percent per annum, the individual will have an account balance of $227,000 at the end of thirty-five years if fees and expenses
are 0.5 percent. In contrast, if fees and expenses are 1.5 percent, the account
balance will only grow to $163,000. A difference of 1 percent in fees and
expenses reduces the individual’s account balance by 28 percent.221 Put another way, if an individual has an account balance of $100,000 earning a 7
percent annual return over twenty-five years, the individual will pay a total
of $141,400 in fees if he is charged 1.2 percent in annual fees. In contrast, if
the individual is charged 0.3 percent in annual fees, the individual will only
pay a total of $39,275 in fees. The difference between 1.2 percent and 0.3
percent in annual fees over a period of twenty-five years on a $100,000 account balance translates into a difference of just over $100,000 in total fees.222
219 The state programs typically provide for the state to initially fund the start-up costs, but then
provide for the state to be reimbursed for those costs. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 178 note (2015); Act of
June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 §§ 12, 13 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 178.225
(2015)); Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150, § 30 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/30(m) (2016)).
220 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004(e) (West 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(m); H.B.
5591 § 3(a)(9), 2016 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2016).
221 DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES 1–2 (2013),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html.
222 Ian Salisbury, The One Retirement Move You Must Get Right, MONEY, July 2014, at 48. See also
Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Protecting Consumer Investors by Facilitating “Improved Performance”
Competition, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (“[A]n individual saving $500 a month from the age of twentyfive to sixty-five could see their end-of-career savings diminished by nearly half as a result of a difference
of two percent in fund fees.”).

2016]

CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP

69

Because plan fees can have such a significant impact on retirement savings, 401(k) plan fees has been the subject of considerable scrutiny in recent
years.223 The Department of Labor has issued a series of regulations mandating fee disclosure,224 and plan participants have filed a host of lawsuits claiming that excessive plan fees violate ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.225 Of
course, the protections under ERISA would not apply to state automatic enrollment IRAs programs that qualify for the safe harbor because such state
programs would be exempt from ERISA.
That is not to suggest, however, that states are blind to the importance
of plan fees. In recent years, plan fees paid by public sector pension funds
have come under increasing scrutiny,226 and states have been making efforts
to regulate, or at least encourage transparency with respect to, plan fees paid
by public pensions.227
Recognizing the importance of plan fees, state automatic enrollment
IRA legislation generally requires that plan fees be kept low. For example,
Connecticut law charges the Connecticut Retirement Security Board with
proposing a plan with “[l]ow administrative costs that shall be limited to an

223 Similarly, mutual fund fees have also been the subjects of concern. See, e.g., Ayres & Curtis,
supra note 222, at 3.
224 For a discussion of the Department of Labor’s initiatives on 401(k) plan fees beginning in the late
1990s, see Kathryn L. Moore, 401(k) Plan Fees: A Trifecta of Governmental Oversight, in 2009 N.Y.U.
REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 17-1–17-16 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., LexisNexis 2015).
225 For a summary of the cases, see Groom Law Grp., Chartered, 401(k) Plan Fee Cases (Sept. 30,
2015), http://www.groom.com/resources-920.html.
226 For a discussion of the recent focus on fees paid to private equity firms and hedge funds, see
Timothy W. Martin, Pensions’ Private-Equity Mystery: The Full Cost, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pensions-private-equity-mystery-the-full-cost-1448235489; Gretchen Morgenson, Pension Funds Can Only Guess at Private Equity’s Costs, NY TIMES (May 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/business/pension-funds-can-only-guess-at-private-equityscost.html?_r=0. See also SCOTT C. EVANS, NYC COMPTROLLER,THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT FEES ON
PENSION
FUND
VALUE,
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/BAM_
Report_Impact_of_Management_Fees.pdf (New York City Bureau of Asset Management’s analysis of
total dollar impact of active management fees on value of NYC public pension funds); Len Boselovic,
Gov. Wolf Thinks Pension Funds Paying Too Much in Fees, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (April 12,
2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/pittsburgh-company-news/2015/04/12/Gov-Wolf-thinkspension-funds-paying-too-much-in-fees/stories/201504120009 (reporting that PA governor wants to
shore up PA public pension funds by significantly reducing the $662 million the funds pay in investment
management fees).
227 For a discussion of the use of placement agents by public sector pension funds and efforts to curb
their use, see, for example, Edward Siedle, Billions for Bupkis: Pension Placement Agents, FORBES (June
25, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites#/sites/edwardsiedle/2014/06/25/billions-for-bupkis-pensionplacement-agents/#6498a0476aca; Christina M. Sumpio, Marketing of Investment Advisers to Public Pension Plans: Achieving Transparency Through Lobbying Regulations, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 243
(2014). See also Peter Feltman, States Call for Better Private Equity Fee Disclosure, CQ ROLL CALL,
2015 WL 4647868 (Aug. 6, 2015) (reporting that financial officials from 11 states are asking the SEC to
require better disclosure about private equity fund fees).
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annual, predetermined percentage of the total plan balance.”228 The California
legislation caps administrative costs at 1 percent of the program’s assets,229
and the Illinois program caps administrative expenses at 0.75 percent.230
Experience in both private-sector and public-sector pensions makes it
clear that plan fees in state automatic enrollment IRAs should be transparent.231 Whether the states’ rules/cap-based approach to fees is likely to be
more effective than the standards-based approach currently used in private232
and public-sector pensions233 is an empirical question with no ready answer.
Moreover, whether administrative fees can, in fact, be kept low depends on
a host of factors such the size of the program, the structure of the program,
and who administers the program.
Due to economies of scale, the larger a state program is, the lower its
costs are likely to be. For example, the authors of a Connecticut feasibility
study found that the Connecticut program could be “self-sustaining” with
combined investment and program management fees of 0.5 percent if program assets totaled $1 billion.234 The size of the state program, in turn, depends on a variety of factors, such as the number of covered workers and
design features like the default contribution rate. The analysts studying the
proposed Connecticut program recommended that the program’s default contribution rate be set at 6 percent rather than 3 percent in order to ensure that
the program could reach its goal of $1 billion in a relatively short time.235
In order to keep administrative costs down, states are likely to outsource
the day-to-day administration of the plans. The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Investment Board advised the Department of Labor in a
comment letter that it “anticipates outsourcing the day-to-day administration,
investment, and custody/trustee duties to qualified third parties selected from
the private sector after competitive bidding.”236 The preamble to the final regulation clarifies that such delegation is permissible. It explains that the Department of Labor amended the safe harbor to use the phrase “State (or governmental agency or instrumentality of the State)” throughout the safe harbor
to clarify that, as long as the state program is established under state law, the
“program is eligible for the safe harbor even if the state law delegates a wide
array of implementation and administrative authority (such as . . . contracting
228

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-415(a)(7) (2014).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004(d) (West 2013).
230 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(m) (2016).
231 Cf. Keith Overly & Michael J. Studebaker, Best Practices for Public Sector DC Plans, BENEFITS
MAG. 42, 46 (Aug. 2015) (stating that “disclosure of fees is considered a best practice”).
232 See, e.g., ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1108(b)(2) (2012) (exempting services by party-in-interest from
general prohibited transaction provisions if no more than “reasonable” compensation paid).
233 See, e.g., Overly & Studebaker, supra note 231 (stating that “fees should be reasonable and equitable”).
234 CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, supra note 148, at 5, 37–38.
235 Id. at 5.
236 Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3.
229
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with third-party vendors . . .) to a board, committee, department, authority . .
. .”237 Moreover, the express text of the safe harbor provides that a program
will not fail to satisfy the safe harbor merely because it uses service providers
to operate and administer the program, so long as the state (or governmental
agency or instrumentality) “retains full responsibility for the operation and
administration of the program.”238
The proposed safe harbor contained a provision that could have had an
adverse impact on administrative costs. It provided that the state program
must “not require that an employee or beneficiary retain any portion of contributions or earnings in his or her IRA and [must] not otherwise impose any
restrictions on withdrawals or impose any cost or penalty on transfers or rollovers permitted under the Internal Revenue Code.”239
In comment letters to the Department of Labor, the States expressed
concern that this requirement could limit a program’s ability to authorize certain types of investments, such as annuities, and to impose reasonable restrictions on withdrawals in order to limit administrative costs.240 The States
requested that the requirement be modified to permit the States to provide
investment options with less liquidity and to impose reasonable restrictions
on withdrawals to increase administrative efficiency and limit costs.241 In addition, the California Board asked that that requirement be modified to provide the Board with the flexibility to impose a hardship withdrawal standard,242 like the hardship withdrawal standard found in many 401(k) and 457
plans. In response to these concerns, the Department of Labor eliminated this
condition from the final safe harbor.243
It is not clear exactly how expensive the state automatic enrollment IRA
programs will be to administer. It is clear, however, that states are cognizant
of the importance of fees and will make an effort to minimize administrative
costs.

237

Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
238 Although the states are in favor of delegating administration of their programs, they seek to limit
their liability with respect to the third parties’ actions. Employee Pension Benefit Plans, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 2510.3-2 (h)(xii)(2)(ii)).
239 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(1)(vi)).
240 See, e.g., Lembo & Nappier, supra note 134, at 5.
241 Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 6–8.
242 Id. at 8. Under the Treasury Regulations, a hardship distribution is a distribution made on account
of an immediate and heavy financial need of an employee or his or her spouse or dependent and is necessary to satisfy that financial need. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(3) (2014). The regulations set forth six
situations in which a distribution will be deemed to satisfy an immediate and heavy need. Treas. Reg. §
1.401(k)-1(d)(3)(iii)(B).
243 See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed.
Reg. 59,464, 59,476 (Aug. 30, 2016) (explaining why the condition was eliminated).
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Will the Interests of Participants be Adequately Protected?

Whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs will lead to increased retirement savings depends, in part, on whether participants’ interests
will be adequately protected against misfeasance or malfeasance. Concerns
can arise at two different levels: (1) at the employer level; for example, employers may withhold contributions from wages but fail to direct the contributions to the plan; and (2) at the plan level; for example, the plan’s investment manager may mismanage or even embezzle funds.
ERISA contains explicit fiduciary standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligations to address these concerns.244 ERISA’s fiduciary provisions
are enforced through private civil actions and through the Department of Labor’s civil investigations, criminal investigations, voluntary correction program, and informal complaint program. In 2015 alone, the Department of
Labor closed 2,441 civil investigations, with 67 percent of the cases ending
in monetary recoveries for plans or other corrective action and 275 criminal
investigations leading to the indictment of 67 individuals.245
Since ERISA’s fiduciary protections would not apply to state programs
exempt from ERISA under the Department of Labor’s new safe harbor, it is
neither surprising nor unreasonable that state programs must satisfy the following requirements in order to qualify for the safe harbor: (1) “[t]he state
[must] assume[] responsibility for the security of payroll deductions and employee savings”246 and (2) “[t]he state [must] adopt measures to ensure that
employees are notified of their rights and create a mechanism for the enforcement of those rights.”247
This section focuses on these requirements and whether state law is
likely to adequately protect participants’ interests.248

244 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1101-1114 (2012). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, one of Congress’ primary concerns in enacting ERISA was with the mismanagement of funds. Massachusetts v.
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989). See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 306-09 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that one of the motivations for the enactment of ERISA was to protect employee benefit funds
from being exploited for the benefit of employers who maintain them).
245 See Fact Sheet: EBSA Restores Over $696.3 Million to Employee Benefit Plans, Participants and
Beneficiaries, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFIT SEC. ADMIN. (Mar. 13, 2016), http://www.dol.
gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsFYagencyresults.html (describing EBSA’s various programs and monetary recoveries).
246 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-2(h)).
247 Id.
248 It is worth noting that even though ERSIA will not apply to state automatic enrollment IRA programs, federal law will still provide some level of protection. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code’s
prohibited transaction rules, contained in IRC § 4975, will apply to the state automatic enrollment IRAs.
See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464,
59,467 (Aug. 30, 2016) (clarifying that prohibited transaction rules under the Internal Revenue Code apply

2016]

1.

CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP

73

Protection Against Misfeasance and Malfeasance at the Employer
Level

A number of states submitted comment letters in response to the safe
harbor’s requirements intending to ensure that employees’ rights are protected.249 The states expressed the belief that the first of these two requirements was intended to protect employees against employer fraud and ensure
that the employees’ withholdings are transmitted in a timely and proper fashion. The states were concerned, however, that this requirement could be construed as requiring states to act as a guarantor where the states would be held
accountable for the misfeasance or malfeasance of employers. The states asserted that they would, of course, use their police powers to enforce their
laws to correct any misfeasance or malfeasance and punish wrongdoers.
They asked that the first requirement be eliminated or amended to make clear
that states are not to be held accountable for the wrongdoing of employers
and/or payroll vendors.250
As for the second requirement, the states requested clarification that
they are not responsible for “ensuring” that employees are notified of their
rights, and that they are not required to adopt new laws to enforce employees’
rights.251 The states contended that the appropriate party (typically the plan
administrator), rather than the state, should be required to provide employees
with notice, and that no new laws need to be enacted to enforce employees’
rights. Instead, existing wage and employment laws should be adequate to
protect employees’ rights.
The Department of Labor retained the two disputed conditions in the
final safe harbor.252 In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department
clarified that the first of these “conditions does not make states guarantors or
hold them strictly liable for any and all employers’ failures to transmit payroll
deductions.”253 Rather, according to the Department, the condition is satisfied

to IRAs used in state enrollment IRA programs). The prohibited transaction rules under the Internal Revenue Code are similar, though not identical to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules. See BENDER’S
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PLANS, § 20 (Alvin D. Lurie, ed., 2008) (providing a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences between ERISA and IRC prohibited transaction rules).
249 See, e.g., Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3-4; Lucy Mullany
& John Bouman, Illinois Asset Bldg. Grp., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 15, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #25), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00023.pdf.
250 See, e.g., Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 4.
251 Id. at 7.
252 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,476 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-2(h)(1)(iii)&(iv)).
253 Id. at 59, 470.
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if a state establishes and follows “a process to ensure that employers transmit
payroll deductions safely, appropriately and in a timely fashion.”254
The Department of Labor further declared that no single approach was
necessary to satisfy the requirement.255 It noted that some states have in place
wage withholding and theft laws to protect employees from wage theft and
similar problems.256 According to the Department, wage theft laws and enforcement programs would ordinarily satisfy the requirement if they are applicable to the state automatic enrollment IRA programs and are enforced by
state agents.257 The Department also noted that some states, such as Connecticut, are considering specific enforcement provisions for their programs.258
According to the Department, this approach would be permissible under the
final safe harbor as well.259
It is worth noting that wage theft, broadly defined, refers to the failure
to pay workers the wages they are owed.260 It may include paying workers
less than the legally mandated minimum wage or less than the contractually
agreed-upon wage, requiring workers to work “off the clock” without pay,
stealing tips, illegally deducting fees from wages or simply not paying a
worker anything at all.261
Wage theft claims may be pursued in a variety of ways. For example,
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division is charged with
enforcing the right to a minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act,262

254

Id.
Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 The Department of Labor cited §§ 7(e) and 10(b) of the Connecticut law. Savings Arrangements
Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,470 n.32 (Aug. 30,
2016). Section 7(e) imposes a timing requirement. Specifically, it requires that withholdings be transmitted no later than the fifteenth business day of the month following the month in which the contribution is
withheld. Section 10(b) amends Connecticut’s general wage withholding law to extend to the state automatic enrollment IRA program.
259 Id.
260 Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 656
(2014). (stating that “wage theft” generally refers to “the nonpayment of wages for work that has already
been performed.”) Narrowly defined, wage theft refers to paying workers less than the federally required
minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Todd A. Palo, Minimum Wage, Justifiably Unenforced?, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 36, 39 (2010) (using the term in its narrow sense and contending that
the failure of the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division to enforce the minimum wage is
justified because it is a non-basic human right and the Division does not have sufficient resources to
enforce the right).
261 Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., Nat’l Emp’t. Law Project, Hollow Victories: The Crisis in Collecting
Unpaid Wages for California’s Worker 4 (2013), http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/hollow-victoriesthe-crisis-in-collecting-unpaid-wages-for-californias-workers/.
262 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2012).
255
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and state agencies, such as the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, are charged with enforcing state wage laws.263 In addition, workers may file wage theft claims in court.
Wage theft is an endemic problem,264 and wage theft laws do not provide
workers with as robust a remedy as the states suggest.265 First, the state and
federal agencies charged with enforcing wage laws are often underfunded
and understaffed and thus slow in pursuing claims.266 Second, workers, particularly low-income workers, often have difficulty finding an attorney to
represent them if they choose to pursue their claims in court.267 Indeed, according to a study by the UCLA Labor Center’s National Employment Project, “a shocking percentage of workers are unable to recover their unpaid
wages in California . . . workers and state officials alike lack sufficient legal
tools to enforce the law and to recover unpaid wages from employers who
engage in unscrupulous business practices to avoid payment.”268 For example, even though the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement

263 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 95 (West 2016); CAL. DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENF’T, THE 2002
UPDATE OF THE DLSE POLICIES AND INTERPRETATION MANUAL (REVISED) 1-1 (2006) (containing enforcement standards for the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)).
264 See What Is Wage Theft?: Frequently Asked Questions, WAGETHEFT.ORG, http://www.
wagetheft.org/faq/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2016) (“Wage theft is endemic, and no group of workers is immune. . . .”); ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 12 (2009), http://www.labor.ucla.edu/wage-theft/
(documenting wage theft in three American cities).
265 See William Petroski, Senate Democrats Offer State Plan to Stop Iowa Wage Theft, DES MOINES
REG. (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/27/iowa-wagetheft-senate/22430863/ (According to Democratic State Senator Bisignano, “Iowa’s wage theft laws don’t
protect Iowa workers from being ripped off and don't protect honest businesses who pay their employees.”).
266 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, WAGE THEFT INVESTIGATIONS,
REPORT 2013-S-38 1, 7 (2014) (finding among other things that the State’s Division of Labor Standards
does not complete wage theft investigations in a timely manner and its management system does not
provide accurate or useful case management reports); Palo, supra note 260, at 56 (using the term in its
narrow sense and contending that the failure of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor Wage & Hour Div. to enforce the
minimum wage is justified because it is a non-basic human right and the Division does not have sufficient
resources to enforce the right).
267 While, in theory, workers may file suit, workers, particularly low-income workers, may have
difficulty finding attorneys to represent them. See Effective Strategies and Tool for Wage Enforcement:
Hearing Before the S. Interim Comm. on Workforce & Gen. Gov’t, 2015-2016 Leg., 78th Sess. 4–5 (Or.
2016) (testimony of Laura Huizar, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/
NELP-Testimony-Laura-Huizar-Wage-Theft-Enforcement.pdf (“A civil legal needs assessment in Washington State found that ‘only half of low-income people with employment problems were able to get
advice or representation from an attorney.’”); CHO ET AL., supra note 261, at 7 (noting that hiring an
attorney to file a civil suit is “not typically a viable option for many low-wage workers” who may not be
able to convince an attorney “to take a case where low to no attorney fees are likely”).
268 CHO ET AL., supra note 261, at 2.
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issued awards of more than $282 million between 2008 and 2011, workers
were only able to collect $42 million, or about 15 percent, of the awards.269
2.

Protection Against Misfeasance and Malfeasance at the Plan
Level

A few commenters submitted letters to the Department of Labor arguing
that, given the states’ track record with public pensions, states should not be
trusted to manage pensions for private-sector employees. In one example,
Standard Retirement Services, Inc. asserted that insulating state automatic
enrollment IRA programs from ERISA’s fiduciary protections is “particularly troublesome in that some states have a questionable track record in protecting their own employees’ pension assets.”270 Similarly, the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research pointed to the states’ track record with state pensions and noted that state governments have accumulated $1 trillion of debt
in their public pensions and officials in some states have aggressively invested public pension funds to help shape political agendas.271

269

Id.
Lohmann, surpa note 131, at 2.
271 The Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving
Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71,
Comment #67), at 1, 3, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00067.pdf. Two individuals involved in the financial services industry, Scott Stolz and Christopher Tobe, also submitted comment letters pointing to problems in public
sector pensions in support of their objections to state automatic enrollment IRA programs. Scott Stolz,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #15), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00015.pdf;
Christopher Tobe, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by
States for Non-Governmental Employees (Dec. 15, 2015) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #8),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00008.pdf. In an interesting twist, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce contends that public
pensions have some safeguards that would not be present for state programs for private sector employees.
Specifically, some public pensions benefit from the fact that the state officials who are responsible for
governing the plan, such as the state treasurer, are also plan participants. In addition, many public pensions
are subject to collective bargaining. Randel Johnson & Aliya Wong, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #55), at 4–5,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/
public-comments/1210-AB71/00055.pdf.
270
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Without a doubt, many state pension plans are woefully underfunded.
Indeed, according to a recent study by The Pew Charitable Trusts, state pensions have an aggregate unfunded liability of $968 billion.272 But, simply because many state pension plans are significantly underfunded does not mean
that states cannot and should not be trusted to run automatic enrollment IRA
programs.
First, much of the underfunding of state pension plans is due to the fact
that they are defined benefit plans, and defined benefit plans raise unique
funding issues.273 Those funding issues would not arise in the context of state
automatic enrollment IRA programs. So long as employers actually forward
employees’ contributions as required under the terms of the program, a state
automatic enrollment IRA program will never be “underfunded” in the way
that a state defined benefit pension plan can be.
Second, most state pensions are funded, in part, by the state. State funding of public pensions gives rise to political accountability issues because
funding must go through the budget process, a highly political process, and
those who are affected will not realize harm or benefit until the future.274 In
contrast, under the new safe harbor, only employees may contribute to the
programs. Thus, the political accountability issues that arise when states must
make contributions to fund state pension plans do not apply to state automatic
enrollment IRA programs.
Nevertheless, proper governance of state automatic enrollment IRA programs is important; there have been numerous instances of criminal misconduct with respect to the management of public pensions.275 Although “struc-

272 See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP: CHALLENGES PERSIST
3—4 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/07/the-state-pensions-funding-gap-challenges-persist (showing that state pensions have a total unfunded liability of $968
billion and showing unfunded liability in each state).
273 For an explanation of the unique funding issues that arise in public defined benefit pension plans,
see, for example, Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good Governance?: State
Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV.
1317, 1323–25 (2014).
274 See Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 128. See also Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case for Public Pension Reform:
Early Evidence from Kentucky, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 585, 596 (2014) (explaining the moral hazard that
arises in public pensions where “political actors, often in exchange of promises of support at the polls,
commit to more generous benefits that taxpayers can realistically afford”).
275 Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 273, at 1356 n.253 (citing sources discussing pay-for-play
scandals in New York and Illinois). See also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Pension Funds’ Middlemen Come
Under Scrutiny, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2015, 2015 WLNR 14022557 (noting that former chief executive of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System pled guilty to committing bribery and
fraud because he steered more than $3 billion in funds to a private equity firm after being bribed by a
placement agent firm headed by the former deputy mayor of Los Angeles); James Drew, Secrecy Cloaks
Placement Agents’ Role in Texas Public Pension Fund Investments, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 3,
2013),
http://www.dallasnews.com/investigations/headlines/20120721-secrecy-cloaks-place
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tures, standards, and regulations can never be a complete defense against individuals determined to do wrong . . . [t]hey are nonetheless our best assurance that savers, investors, and employees are protected against problems of
this kind”,276 and research indicates that governance can have a significant
impact on the performance of public pensions.277 Recent studies have shown
that pension fund board composition is strongly related to the performance
of public pensions’ private equity investments278 and that increasing political
appointees and employee members on public pension boards increases the
funding performance of public pensions.279
Both the California Act and the Illinois Act call for diverse representation on the state boards. The California Act provides for the appointment of
an individual with retirement savings and investment expertise by the Senate
Committee on Rules, the appointment of an employee representative by the
Speaker of the Assembly, and the appointment of a public member by the
Governor.280 The Illinois Act charges the Governor with appointing two public representatives with expertise in retirement savings plan administration or

ment-agents-role-in-texas-public-pension-fund-investments.ece (noting that Dallas money manager pled
guilty to corruption charges in New York for paying kickbacks to a placement officer who also served as
the chief fundraiser for the state’s comptroller); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges State Street for Payto-Play Scheme (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-8.html (reporting that State
Street Bank and Trust Company agreed to pay the Securities and Exchange Commission $12 million to
settle charges that it conducted a pay-to-play scheme to win contracts to service Ohio pension funds).
276 Anne Maher, Transparency and Accountability of Public Pension Funds, in Public Pension Fund
Management: Governance, Accountability, and Investment Policies, Proceedings of the Second Public
Pension Fund Management Conference May 2003 91–92 (Alberto R. Musalem and Robert J. Palacios
eds. 2004). Cf. John K. Wald & Hongxian Zhang, Corruption, Governance, and Public Pension Funds
(Jan. 8, 2015) (finding that having a new state treasurer can lead to higher public pension returns in states
with corrupt governments); David Hess and Gregorio Impavido, Governance of Public Pension Funds:
Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence 26–27 (World Bank Pol. Res. Working
Paper No. 3110, Aug. 2003) (discussing importance of information and transparency in governance of
public pension funds).
277 Maher, supra note 276, at 93 (citing K. Amgachtseer, A Framework for Public Pension Fund
Management (Paper presented at the First World Bank Conference on Managing Public Pension Reserves,
Sept. 20-21, 2001, Washington, D.C)).
278 Aleksander Andonov et al., Pension Fund Board Composition and Investment Performance: Evidence from Private Equity (March 25 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754820.
279 See Gang Chen et al., The Effect of Board Composition on Public Sector Pension Funding, 27 J.
PUBLIC BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 352 (Fall 2015). See also Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline
for U.S Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663
(2015) (studying effect of institutional design on funding levels of public pensions). But see Wald &
Zhang, supra note 276 (finding that board size and board composition have little impact on investment
performance).
280 S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, §§ 12, 13 (Cal. 2016). Cf. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1104(a)(1)(A)–
(B) (2012)).
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investment, a representative of participating employers, and a representative
of enrollees.281
In addition, the state laws impose express fiduciary duties, which are
drawn from ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.282 California law, similar to
ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(A)-(B), provides that the board, program administrator,
and staff shall discharge their duties solely in the interest of the program participants (1) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to program participants and defraying reasonable administrative expenses, and (2) by investing with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent person acting in like capacity and familiar with
those matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
with like aims.283 Illinois,284 Connecticut,285 and Maryland286 laws impose similar duties.287
Still, the state programs differ from private programs governed by
ERISA in a couple of significant ways. First, the state programs raise sovereign immunity issues that are not present in private-sector plans.288 Second,
state law may provide for more circumscribed remedies than ERISA.289 For
example, Connecticut law authorizes the Attorney General to investigate any
potential fiduciary violation and to bring suit in state court if it finds such a
violation, but limits remedies for such breaches to injunctive action and does
not authorize private actions.290 ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, in contrast, are

281

Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/20 (2016)). Connecticut and Maryland law also call for diverse representation on the
board. See An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 §1(b)
(Reg. Sess.); Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323
§12–201(B).
282 For an overview of ERISA’s express fiduciary provisions, see Moore, supra note 187, at § 6.04.
283 S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, § 2(a)(1)(D)–(F) (Cal. 2016)
284 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/25 (2016)).
285 An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 § 6 (Reg.
Sess.).
286 Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323 §12–
203(A).
287 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/25 (2016)). The state laws also expressly limit the use of contributions to paying benefits,
administrative expenses, and investments. See 21 CA. GOV’T CODE § 100004(e); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
80/25 (2016); 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323 §12–301(D).
288 See David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 245–
48 (2015) (discussing approaches states have taken to sovereign immunity claims in fiduciary litigation
against public pension trustees).
289 For an overview of ERISA remedies, see Moore, supra note 187, at § 7.08.
290 An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 § 10
(Reg. Sess.).
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enforced principally by private actions,291 and remedies are not limited to injunctive relief.292 Overall, it appears that the state programs provide a reasonable level of protection against mismanagement at the plan level. They do
not, however, eliminate all such risk.
F.

Will Employers Shift from Voluntary Private-Sector Pension Plans
with Higher Limits and Matching Contributions to State Automatic
IRA Programs with Lower Limits and No Matching Contributions?

Whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs will lead to greater
total retirement savings also turns on what effect they will have on privatesector pension plans.
In theory, state automatic enrollment IRA programs may effect privatesector plans in one of three ways: (1) they may have no impact on privatesector pension plans; (2) they may encourage employers that currently do not
have private-sector pension plans to establish private-sector pension plans;
or (3) they may encourage employers that currently have private-sector pension plans to shift from private-sector pension plans to the new state program.
If state automatic enrollment IRA programs have no effect on privatesector pension plans, and the state programs cause workers who are not currently covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan to contribute to the
state program, then the state programs are obviously likely to result in increased retirement savings.293 In addition, if the state programs encourage
employers who do not currently have private-sector pension plans to establish private plans, then total retirement savings are likely to increase. On the
other hand, if the state programs encourage employers that currently have
private-sector pension plans to shift from private plans to state automatic enrollment IRA programs, the state programs may result in overall lower retirement savings.
Shifting from private-sector pension plans to state automatic enrollment
IRAs may result in reduced overall retirement savings for two reasons. First,
IRAs are subject to lower contribution limits than private-sector plans. Section 219(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits an individual from
291

See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1132(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (authorizing participants and beneficiaries,
among others, to bring suit to enforce ERISA’s provisions).
292 See id.§ 409 (imposing personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg
& Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 250 (2008) (holding that ERISA § 502(a)(2) which provides for appropriate
relief under ERISA § 409 authorizes recovery for breach of fiduciary duty that impacts value of plan
assets in participant’s individual account); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 (1996) (holding that
“appropriate” equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) includes individual equitable relief for breach of
fiduciary duty).
293 Currently, workers without an employer-sponsored plan may contribute to an IRA. In fact, however, few workers currently do so. See, e.g., 401(k) and IRAs Fact Sheet, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
https://www.ebri.org/surveys/rcs/1997/index.cfm?fa=401k (last visited Aug. 14, 2016).
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contributing more than $5,500294 to an IRA in 2016.295 On the other hand,
section 402(g) of the Internal Revenue Code permits an individual to contribute up to $18,000 to a 401(k) plan in 2016.296 Second, employers may
contribute to 401(k) and other qualified plans but not to state automatic enrollment IRAs. If an employer elects to make matching or nonelective contributions to a 401(k) plan and/or establish another qualified plan, a total of
$53,000, including the employee’s elective contributions to the 401(k)
plan,297 may be contributed to a defined contribution plan298 on behalf of the
employee299 in 2016.300 In contrast, the new safe harbor prohibits employer
contributions to state automatic enrollment IRAs.
What effect state automatic enrollment IRAs will have on private- sector pension plans is subject to considerable debate. Mark Iwry and David
John, the architects of the original automatic enrollment IRA program, contend that automatic enrollment IRAs will encourage employers to establish
qualified private-sector plans in order to take advantage of the higher contribution ceilings.301 Similarly, in explaining the reason for President Obama’s
proposed federal automatic IRA program, the Treasury Department has noted
that “requiring automatic IRAs could encourage employers to adopt an employer plan, thereby permitting much greater tax-favored employee contributions than an IRA and offer the option of employer contributions.”302
294

If an individual’s compensation is less than $5,500, the limit is capped at the individual’s compensation. I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(B) (2015).
295 See Press Release, IRS, IRS Announces 2016 Pension Plan Limitations; 401(k) Contribution
Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2016, IR 2015-228 (Oct. 21, 2015) [hereinafter IRS Press Release], (announcing 2016 limits). An individual age 50 or over may make an additional “catch-up contribution” of up $1,000 to an IRA. I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(B).
296 See IRS Press Release, supra note 295.
297 See I.R.C. § 415(c)(2)(B) (defining annual additions to which I.R.C. § 415(c) limit applies to
include employee contributions).
298 In addition, an employer may also establish a defined benefit plan. The annual benefit that a
participant may receive under a defined benefit plan is the lesser of $160,000, adjusted for increases in
the cost of living, or 100 percent of the participant’s average compensation for the 3 consecutive years
during which the participant had his or her highest compensation. Id. at § 1.415(b)-(1)(a). The 2016 limit,
adjusted for increases in the cost of living, is $210,000. IRS Press Release, supra note 295.
299 I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A). Just as contributions to IRAs cannot exceed the individual’s compensation
if the individual’s compensation is less than the I.R.C. § 219 limit, total contributions to a defined contribution plan cannot exceed an individual’s compensation if the individual’s compensation is less than the
I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) limit. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(B).
300 See IRS Press Release, supra note 295.
301 IWRY & JOHN, supra note 201, at 8 (stating that the “automatic IRA is designed with a modest
contribution limit and no employer contributions to induce employers to graduate to a 401(k) plan or
SIMPLE plan”).
302 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS’ FISCAL YEAR
2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 135 (2016). The fact that the Treasury Department’s position is consistent
with that of Mark Iwry and David John is hardly surprising since Mark Iwry was the Treasury Department’s senior adviser and deputy assistant secretary for retirement and health policy at the time the budget
was introduced.
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On the other hand, private-sector service providers, investment managers, and organizations representing their respective interests argue that state
automatic enrollment IRAs could cause employers to shift from private-sector plans to state programs.303 Standard Retirement Services, Inc., an Oregonbased retirement plan services provider, contends that the availability of state
automatic enrollment IRA programs could encourage employers to terminate
private pension plans in favor of state run plans in order to reduce their responsibility, liability, and costs.304 BlackRock, “a leading manager of pension
assets,” asserts that
[g]iven the daunting administrative burdens and the fiduciary risk associated with
ERISA and Code compliance, it is only natural to expect employers, in particular
small employers, to embrace a less cumbersome state program as an alternative,
even if the program’s savings rates are lower and its investment alternatives are
more limited.305

Ultimately, what effect, if any, state automatic enrollment IRA programs would likely have on employers’ willingness to offer private pension
plans is an empirical question to which there is no ready answer. As Mark
Iwry and David John argue, state programs could encourage employers that
do not currently have plans to establish private-sector plans with higher limits
once the employers become accustomed to offering plans.306 But, as those
with vested interests in the current system argue, they could cause employers
to terminate private-sector plans to avoid regulation under ERISA.

303

In comment letters to the Department of Labor, this argument was made by The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, a conservative free market think tank, the SPARK Institute, an organization
representing the interests of service providers and investment managers, the Financial Services
Roundtable, an organization representing the largest integrated financial services companies, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the “voice of the U.S. securities industry,” and the Defined Contribution Institutional Investment Association. Bleier, supra note 131, at 1 n.1, 3; Defined Contribution Inst. Inv. Assoc., supra note 133, at 6; Rouse, supra note 133, at 2, 7; Richard Foster, Fin. Svcs.
Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #61), at 7,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00061.pdf; The Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, supra note 271, at 2.
304 Lohmann, supra note 131, at 4.
305 Barbara Novick, BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #32), at 3, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB71.html.
306 IWRY & JOHN, THE RET. SEC. PROJECT, supra note 201, at 26-27.
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Will State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs be Preempted by
ERISA?

Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”307 Thus,
preemption under ERISA § 514(a) applies if there is (1) a “state law” that (2)
“relates to” (3) an “employee benefit plan.”308
In introducing the proposed safe harbor for state automatic enrollment
IRAs, the Department of Labor stated, “the objective of the proposed safe
harbor is to diminish the chances that, if the issue were ultimately litigated,
the courts would conclude that state payroll deduction savings arrangements
are preempted by ERISA.”309 The Department of Labor thus recognized that
although it may provide guidance on the question, it is ultimately for the
courts to decide whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are
preempted by ERISA.310
Opponents of state automatic enrollment IRA programs contended that
the proposed safe harbor contradicted Congressional intent behind ERISA
and would create complexity in a system that ERISA preemption is intended
to protect against.311 The Department of Labor did not address this argument
in its preamble to the final regulation. It, however, implicitly rejected the argument by retaining a safe harbor in the final regulation. Although the Department of Labor has made it clear that in its view, state automatic enrollment IRA programs that satisfy the terms of the safe harbor are not employee
benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, the question remains whether ERISA
preempts state laws that mandate automatic enrollment IRAs even if the laws
satisfy the requirements of the safe harbor.
1.

State Law” Requirement

Section 514(c) of ERISA defines the terms “State” and “State law”
broadly for purposes of preemption. Specifically, it defines “State Law” to
include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having
307

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
See id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), (b) (2012).
309 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,009 (Nov. 18, 2015).
310 In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department repeated, “By articulating the types of
state payroll deduction savings programs that would be exempt from ERISA, the proposal sought to create
a safe harbor for the states and employers and thus remove uncertainty regarding Title I coverage of such
state payroll deduction savings programs and the IRAs established and maintained pursuant to them. In
the Department’s view, courts would be less likely to find that statutes creating state programs in compliance with the proposed safe harbor are preempted by ERISA.” Savings Arrangements Established by
States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,466 (Aug. 30, 2016).
311 See, e.g., Johnson & Wong, supra note 271.
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the effect of law, of any State,”312 and “State” to include “a State, any political
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee
benefit plans covered by [ERISA].”313
There is little doubt that a state law creating an automatic enrollment
IRA program qualifies as “State Law” for purposes of ERISA preemption.
2.

Employee Benefit Plan” Requirement

The Department of Labor’s final regulation provides that those state automatic enrollment IRA programs that satisfy the requirements of the safe
harbor are not “employee benefit plans” for purposes of ERISA. The Secretary of Labor has broad authority to promulgate regulations that he finds are
“necessary or appropriate” to carry out the provisions of title I of ERISA.314
The Secretary’s power includes the authority to promulgate regulations that
define what constitutes a “plan” within the meaning of ERISA.315 The Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of what constitutes an ERISA-covered “plan”
is entitled to Chevron316 deference upon judicial review.317 Thus, a court is
likely to defer to the Department of Labor’s interpretation that state automatic
enrollment IRAs that satisfy the requirements of the new safe harbor are not
employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.318
The state automatic enrollment IRAs, however, are not the only potential employee benefit plans at issue. The final regulation provides that “[a]
State savings program will not fail to satisfy the [requirements of the safe
harbor] merely because the program . . . is directed toward those employers
that do not offer some other workplace savings arrangement.”319 The regulation is careful not to expressly refer to employee benefit plans in this provi-
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ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2012).
Id. § 514(c)(2).
314 Id. § 505.
315 See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989).
316 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
317 See Morash, 490 U.S. at 116.
318 See, e.g., William Nelson, Allowing States to Help Workers Save for Retirement—Department of
Labor’s Proposed Rulemaking that Provides a Safe Harbor for State Savings Programs under ERISA, 18
MARQ. BEN. & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2017) (Manuscript at 29–33), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737068 (discussing agency deference before and after Chevron).
319 29 C.F.R. § 2510(h)(2)(i) (2016).
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sion. Many “workplace savings arrangements,” however, are employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.320 For example, 401(k) plans, the most common workplace savings arrangements, are employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.321
To date, each of the state automatic enrollment IRA programs with employer mandates excludes from the mandate employers that sponsor pension
plans.322 For example, the California program applies to “eligible employers
that do not offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan or automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA”323 The Illinois mandate does not apply to employers that have “offered a qualified retirement plan” in the preceding two
years.324
Although ERISA’s definition of employee benefit plan is circular and
has given rise to litigation,325 there is little doubt that “employer-sponsored
retirement plans” as referred to in the California statute and “qualified retirement plans” as defined in the Illinois statute are “employee benefit plans” for
purposes of ERISA preemption.326 Thus, the state automatic enrollment IRA
programs may be preempted if the state laws establishing the programs “relate to” these employee benefit plans.
3.

Relates to” Requirement

Whether a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan “is at the heart
of the ERISA preemption inquiry.”327 Yet determining whether a state law

320 25 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(2)(1) (2007). On the other hand, not all “workplace savings arrangements”
are employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. Specifically, payroll deduction IRAs are not employee
benefit plans for purposes of ERISA if they meet the requirements of the Department of Labor’s regulatory
safe harbor for IRAs. Id. § 2510.3-2(d).
321 Cf. Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2014) (applying ERISA’s fiduciary provisions to 401(k) plan).
322 See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed.
Reg. 59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016)) (stating that “[t]he Department . . . understands that the relevant
laws enacted thus far by the states have been directed toward those employers that do not offer any workplace savings arrangement, rather than focusing on employees who are not eligible for such programs.”).
323 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2013).
324 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2016) (defining “Employer”).
325 For a discussion of the meaning of the term “employee benefit plan” under ERISA and the Supreme Court cases addressing that term, see MOORE, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra
note 187, at 323–26.
326 See discussion supra Part II regarding how state retirement plans are “employee benefit plans.”
327 David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 457 (1987).
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impermissibly “relates to” an employee benefit plan is fraught with uncertainty.328 Although the Supreme Court has focused on the term “relates to” in
eleven separate cases, 329 the meaning of the term remains “murky.”330
a.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Relates to” Requirement

Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the term “relates to” quite
broadly. Indeed, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,331 the Court announced that Congress used the words “relates to” in section 514(a) of ERISA “in their broad
sense.”332 According to the Court, “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if has a connection with or reference
to such a plan.”333
After more than a decade, the Court narrowed the reach of the term “relates to” in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.334 In Travelers, the Court recognized that its “prior
attempt to construe the phrase ‘relate to’ [did] not give [the Court] much help
drawing the line” in determining whether a state law “relates to” an employee
benefit plan for purposes of preemption under ERISA § 514(a). 335 Thus, the
Court declared that it “simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the

328

See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363 (1999) (stating that the key words “relate
to” [and “regulates insurance”] “once again require interpretation for their meaning is not ‘plain’”); Peter
D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS (Supp. 2) 88, 91 (2009) (stating that “[f]inding coherence from the myriad ERISA opinions is
quite difficult. At best, ERISA doctrine is neither predictable nor stable; it is, rather, largely muddled and
most opinions are impenetrable.”)
329 See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S.
141, 147 (2001); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 367 (1999); De Buono v. NYSAILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324–25 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd.
of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 132 (1992); Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990); Mackey
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 96 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524 (1981). The Court has also
applied the “relate to” language in cases focusing on the saving and/or deemer clause. See, e.g., FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58–61 (1990).
330 Cf. Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2007) (stating that despite the fact that the Supreme Court
has ruled on ERISA preemption cases twenty times in the last thirty years, ERISA preemption jurisprudence remains “murky.”).
331 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
332 Id. at 96, 98.
333 Id. at 97.
334 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
335 Id. at 655, 662.
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frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.”336
Although the Court cut back on the reach of the term in Travelers, the
Court has continued to use the Shaw definition of “relates to” as a two-prong
test for determining whether a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan.
Under this two-prong test, a state law relates to an employee benefit plan if
it has (1) a reference to or (2) a connection with an employee benefit plan.337
The “reference to” prong is relatively easy to apply. As the Supreme
Court explained in its most recent preemption decision, Gobeille v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company,338 a state law has a “reference to” an employee
benefit plan if the state law “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA
plans . . . or . . . the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”339
The “connection with” prong, on the other hand, is more difficult to apply.
The Supreme Court has considered whether a state law had an impermissible “connection with” an employee benefit plan in four cases since
1995. Travelers, the first, bellwether case, involved a preemption challenge
to a New York statute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers but not from patients insured by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield and subjected certain HMOs to surcharges that varied with
the number of Medicaid patients the HMOs enrolled.340
The Court declared that it should begin its preemption analysis in this
ERISA case, like in other areas of the law, with a presumption against
preemption.341 It announced that it must look “to the objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive” in applying the “connection with” prong. 342 After briefly reviewing the preemption clause’s legislative history, the Court stated, “The
336

Id. at 656.
Id.
338 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). In Gobeille, the Court held that ERISA preempted a Vermont health care
information reporting law because the law “compels plans to report detailed information about claims and
plan members, [and thus] both intrudes upon ‘a central matter of plan administration’ and ‘interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration.’” Id. at 945 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148
(2001)). The Court declared that the plan reporting, disclosure, and, by implication, recordkeeping, are
fundamental components of ERISA’s regulation of plan administration, and the Vermont law had to be
preempted in order “to prevent the states from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting
requirements.” Id.
339 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
340 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
649 (1995).
341 Id. at 654–55.
342 Id. at 656.
337
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basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”343
The Court distinguished the surcharge law from state laws that mandate
employee benefit structures or their administration.344 The Court recognized
that the surcharges would make Blue Cross/Blue Shield more attractive to
ERISA plans.345 The Court, however, described their effect as “an indirect
economic influence” that “does not bind plan administrators to any particular
choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.”346 According to the Court, “the indirect influence of the surcharges [does not] preclude
uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply bears on the cost of
benefits and the relative costs of competing insurance to provide them.”347
The Court concluded, “cost uniformity was almost certainly not an object of pre-emption, just as laws with only an indirect economic effect on the
relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State are a far
cry from those ‘conflicting directives’ from which Congress meant to insulate ERISA plans.”348 Thus, the Court held that the surcharges did not have
an impermissible “connection with” employee benefit plans and were not
preempted by ERISA.
Two years later in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc,349 the Court reaffirmed that in applying
the “connection with” prong, it “look[s] both to ‘the objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive,’ as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans.”350
In Dillingham, a contractor and subcontractor challenged California’s
prevailing wage law that required payment of prevailing wages to employees
in non-state-approved apprenticeship programs, but permitted the payment
of lower apprenticeship wages to employees participating in state-approved
apprenticeship programs.351 The Court first noted that states have long regulated apprenticeship standards and wages paid for state public works.352 The
Court then found that wages for state public works and standards “to be applied to apprenticeship programs are . . . quite remote from the areas with
343

Id. at 657.
Id. at 657–58.
345 Id. at 659.
346 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
659 (1995).
347 Id. at 660.
348 Id. at 662.
349 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
350 Id. at 325 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658–59) (citation omitted).
351 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 319 (1997).
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which ERISA is expressly concerned—‘reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like.’”353 The Court found that the apprenticeship portion
of the statute, like the surcharge requirement in Travelers, did not bind
ERISA plans to anything.354 Like the surcharges in Travelers, “[t]he prevailing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing
ERISA plans.”355 Thus, the statute did not have a “connection with” employee
benefit plans. 356
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,357 the Supreme Court held that ERISA
preempted a state statute that, upon divorce, automatically revoked the designation of a spouse as a beneficiary of nonprobate assets.358 The Court first
found that the statute implicated “an area of core ERISA concern” because it
regulated “the payment of benefits, a central matter of plan administration.”359 The Court then found that it interfered with one of ERISA’s principal
goals: nationally uniform administration.360 “Plan administrators cannot
make payments simply by identifying the beneficiary specified by the plan
documents. Instead, they must familiarize themselves with state statutes so
353

Id. at 331 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661).
Id. at 332.
355 Id. at 334.
356 The Court interpreted ERISA § 514(a)’s “relates to” prong in two additional cases decided after
Dillingham but before Egelhoff: De Buono and UNUM Life Ins. Co. In neither case did the Court expressly
apply the two-prong, “reference to” and “connection with” test to determine whether the state law “related
to” an employee benefit plan. In the first case, De Buono, the Court expressly reaffirmed Dillingham and
held that a New York state tax on gross receipts of health care facilities operated by ERISA funds was not
preempted. The Court held that the statute was “one of ‘myriad state laws’ of general applicability that
impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not ‘relate to’ them within
the meaning of the governing statute.” De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S.
806, 815 (1997) (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668; Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 333–34). In the second case,
UNUM Life Ins. Co., the Court held that a state common law agency rule providing that “‘the employer
is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group insurance policies’ . . . ‘relate[d]
to’ employee benefit plans” and thus was preempted because it “would have a marked effect on plan
administration.” UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 378–79 (1999) (citing Travelers, 415 U.S.
at 657–58). Such a rule “would ‘forc[e] the employer, as plan administrator, to assume a role, with attendant legal duties and consequences, that it has not undertaken voluntarily’; it would affect not merely
the plan’s bookkeeping obligations regarding to whom benefits checks must be sent, but [would] also
regulat[e] the basic services that a plan may or must provide to its participants and beneficiaries.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
357 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
358 Id. at 143. Specifically, the statute provided:
If a marriage is dissolved or invalidated, a provision made prior to that event that
relates to the payment or transfer at death of the decedent’s interest in a nonprobate
asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the decedent’s former spouse is
revoked. A provision affected by this section must be interpreted, and the nonprobate asset affected passes, as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent,
having died at the time of entry of the decree of dissolution or declaration of invalidity. Id. at 144 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE. § 11.07.010(2)(a) (1994)).
359 Id. at 147–48.
360 Id. at 148.
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that they can determine whether the named beneficiary’s status has been ‘revoked’ by operation of law.”361
Finally, in Gobeille the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a
Vermont health care information reporting law under the “connection with”
prohibition because the law “compels plans to report detailed information
about claims and plan members, [and thus] both intrudes upon ‘a central matter of plan administration’ and ‘interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.’”362 The Court declared that plan reporting, disclosure, and, by
implication, recordkeeping, are fundamental components of ERISA’s regulation of plan administration, thus the Vermont law had to be preempted in
order “to prevent the states from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting requirements.”363
b.

State Law that Exempts Employers that Maintain Any Employee Benefit Plan

A state statute that expressly provides that an employer is exempt from
its mandated automatic enrollment IRA program if the employer maintains
an employee benefit plan should not fail under the first “reference to” prong
because such a law would not “act[] immediately and exclusively upon
ERISA plans,” and “the existence of ERISA plans [would not] be essential
to the law’s operation.”364 In fact, the existence of an ERISA plan would prevent the law from applying to the employer.365
Whether a state statute that expressly exempts an employer that maintains any employee benefit plan fails under the second, “connection with,”
prong proves a much more difficult question. Critics of state automatic enrollment IRA programs contend that such laws would frustrate the purpose
of ERISA preemption—ensuring that plan sponsors are subject to a uniform
body of benefit law.
The critics are absolutely right in pointing to the purposes of ERISA
preemption in determining whether ERISA preemption should apply. Moreover, the critics are correct that uniformity is a critical value underlying

361

Id. at 148–149 (footnote omitted).
Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 945 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
363 Id. at 945.
364 Id. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 325 (1997)).
365 Professor Zelinsky argues that a state statute might fail under this requirement “since [the] mandate refers to the employers’ retirement plans by exempting from the mandate employers sponsoring retirement plans for their respective workforces.” Edward A. Zelinsky, California Dreaming: California
Secure Choice Retirement Savings Act, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 547, 583–84 (2014). Gobeille and Dillingham,
however, make clear that “reference to” means more than simply “referring to” an employee benefit plan.
Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943.
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ERISA preemption. Indeed, the Court stated in Travelers that the basic purpose of ERISA preemption is “to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order
to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”366
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that, where a state
statute expressly provides that an employer is exempt from a state mandated
automatic enrollment IRA program if the employer maintains an employee
benefit plan, such statute does not interfere with nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans. As discussed above, as long as the state
program qualifies under the safe harbor, the state program itself is not an
employee benefit plan. Thus, the fact that different states may choose to have
different programs does not raise concerns about the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans because the state programs themselves
are not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. The question is what
impact the state law would have on private employee benefits plans, not the
programs created by the state.
If a state law mandating automatic enrollment IRAs exempts employers
that offer employee benefit plans, the state law might encourage employers
to adopt ERISA plans in order to avoid the state mandate.367 Thus, the state
law may clearly have an impact on the number of plans in the state. It would
not, however, appear to have an impact on the terms of employee benefit
plans. A strong argument can be made that a state law that simply encourages
the formation of employee benefit plans only has an indirect influence on
employee benefit plans, which is permissible under the reasoning of Travelers and Dillingham. So long as a state law does not have an impact on the
terms of employee benefit plans, it is likely the case that such a law would
not impermissibly “interfere with nationally uniform plan administration.”368
c.

State Law that Only Exempts Employers that Maintain Employee Benefit Plans Meeting Certain Minimum Requirements

Yet, if a state law were not to exempt all employers that sponsor employee benefit plans, but instead were to apply to employers with employee

366 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
657 (1995).
367 Cf. Wagner Law Group, The Impact of “Next Generation” IRAs: myRA Accounts, EZ IRA and
State-Mandated IRAs 8 (April 2016) (stating that “[a]s a result of these types of state mandates, affected
employers may be more receptive to the idea of establishing their own retirement plan or payroll IRA
program” and counseling employers to “consult their legal counsel to determine whether and when they
might become subject to a state mandate, and to confirm how the mandate may be avoided by setting up
their own retirement plan or program”).
368 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 142 (2001).
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benefit plans that do not meet certain minimum requirements, such as minimum default contribution rates or minimum coverage requirements, there is
a strong argument that such a state law would be preempted by ERISA.
To illustrate, when originally introduced, a Connecticut bill did not exempt employers with pension plans if the employer’s plan did not cover employees who were reasonably expected to complete one thousand hours of
service in a calendar year or who had completed at least five hundred hours
of service for the employer in the past two consecutive years.369 Such a provision may very well encourage employers to amend the terms of their plan
to avoid the state mandate. Specifically, an employer might amend the terms
of its plan to ensure that its plan covered all workers required to be covered
in order to avoid the state mandate, that is, all workers who are reasonably
expected to complete one thousand hours of service in a calendar year or who
had completed at least five hundred hours of service for the employer in the
past two consecutive years. More importantly, if different states were to impose mandates with different minimum requirements, such as a 3 percent
minimum default contribution rate in one state and a 6 percent minimum default contribution rate in another state, the state laws could “impermissibly
interfere[]” with a multi-state employer’s ability to sponsor and administer a
uniform plan and thus be preempted under ERISA.370
The proposed safe harbor expressly provided that programs, such as the
one initially proposed in Connecticut, could satisfy the safe harbor. Specifically, it provided that “[a] State savings program will not fail to satisfy the
[requirements of the safe harbor] merely because the program . . . is directed
toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other workplace savings arrangement.”371 Whether a program like the Connecticut program, as initially introduced, would satisfy the requirements of the final safe
harbor is not clear. The final regulation amended the proposed safe harbor to
369

See discussion supra Part III.B.
See Golden Gate, Transcript of Oral Argument, Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City San Francisco,
546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07–17370), 2008 WL 3891805 (oral argument of Curtis A. Cole on
behalf of Respondent Golden Gate Restaurant Association). Similar arguments were made in a number of
comment letters submitted in response to the Department of Labor’s proposed regulation. See, e.g., Fredrik Axsater, Street State Global Advisors, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #26), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00028.pdf; Blass, supra note 131, at 1–2; Jan Jacobson, Am. Benefits Council,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #31), at 2,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00031.pdf; Edmund F. Murphy, III, Empower Retirement, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan.
13, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #16), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00018.pdf.
371 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg.
72,006, 72,009 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(h)(2)(i)).
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provide that “[a] State savings program will not fail to satisfy the [requirements of the safe harbor] merely because the program . . . is directed toward
those employers that do not offer some other workplace savings arrangement.”372 In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department of Labor
explained that it amended the regulatory language in response to concerns
raised by commenters that the proposed safe harbor’s language could “encourage states to focus on whether particular employees of an employer are
eligible to participate in a workplace savings arrangement.”373 The commenters were concerned that this could be overly burdensome on employers and
cause employers to have to keep track of individual employees as they
switched between employer-sponsored plans and state programs.374 In addition, the commenters asserted that burden could provide an incentive for employers not to maintain an employee benefit plan.375 Finding merit in the comments, the Department concluded that the amended “language will reduce
employer involvement in determining employee eligibility for the state program, and it accurately reflects current state laws.”376
The Department’s amendment to the proposed safe harbor clearly reflects its view that state automatic enrollment IRA programs exempting all
employers that offer an employee benefit plan are superior to programs only
exempting employers that offer employee benefit plans meeting certain requirements. Nevertheless, the final regulation does not expressly address
whether programs that only exempt employers with certain employee benefit
plans could still fall within the safe harbor. Nor does it expressly address
whether such programs would be preempted by ERISA.377 The initial position
taken by The Department of Labor in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v.
City and County of San Francisco,378 however, suggests that such programs
would be preempted by ERISA.
In Golden Gate, the Ninth Circuit held that a San Francisco health care
pay-or-play mandate was not preempted by ERISA.379 In that case, a San
Francisco ordinance required covered employers to spend a specified amount
of “health care expenditures to or on behalf of” certain employees.380 Covered
employers were permitted to satisfy the requirement by spending a defined
amount on health care for their employees through their own ERISA-covered
372

Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg.
59,464, 59,477 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(2)(i)).
373 Id. at 59,468.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 The preamble to the final regulation notes that this provision “is not a requirement or condition
of the safe harbor but is only an example of a feature that states may incorporate when designing their
automatic enrollment IRA programs.” Id.
378 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008).
379 Id. at 661.
380 Id. at 643 (quoting S.F. Admin. Code § 14.3(a)).
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plans or by paying a required amount to the city.381 Payments made to the city
did not go into a general fund; instead, they were to be used either to fund
membership in the city’s Health Access Program for uninsured San Francisco
residents or to establish and maintain medical reimbursement accounts for
covered employees.382 The Ninth Circuit recognized that an employer might
be influenced by the San Francisco ordinance to adopt or change an ERISAgoverned plan because the employer might prefer to make a payment to its
own plan rather than making a payment to the city.383 The court nevertheless
found such an indirect influence was entirely permissible under Travelers.384
The court distinguished the San Francisco ordinance from a Maryland
pay-or-play mandate that the Fourth Circuit held to be preempted in Retail
Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder.385 The Maryland statute required
employers with ten thousand or more employees to spend at least 8 percent
of their total payroll on employee health insurance or to pay the difference
between their actual spending and the 8 percent floor to the state.386 Unlike
the San Francisco ordinance, the Maryland law did not impose any restrictions on how the state might spend the funds. Thus, employers who paid
the state rather than providing health care benefits to their employees received no benefit from paying the state. The Fourth Circuit found that the
only rational choice employers had under the Maryland Act was to structure
their employee benefit plans so as to ensure that they spent at least 8 percent
of payroll on health care costs,387 and because the statute effectively required
that employers structure their employee health plans to provide a certain level
of benefits, the statute had an obvious “connection with” employee benefit
plans and was preempted by ERISA.388
The Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate reasoned that because “the San Francisco Ordinance provide[d] tangible benefits to employees when their employers [chose] to pay the City rather than to establish or alter ERISA
plans,”389 the San Francisco ordinance was distinguishable from the Maryland statute. Unlike employers in Maryland, San Francisco employers had a
meaningful alternative to creating or amending their ERISA plans.390 The
Ninth Circuit held that because the San Francisco ordinance did not compel
381

Id. at 644–45.
Id.
383 Id. at 656.
384 Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 656 (citing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
385 Id. at 659 (citing Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007)).
386 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 183.
387 Id. at 193.
388 Id. at 193–94. The Eastern District of New York reached a similar conclusion with respect to the
Suffolk County Fair Share for Health Care Act, which was similar to the Maryland law at issue in Fielder.
See Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
389 Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 660.
390 Id. at 660–61.
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employees to establish or amend their ERISA plans the ordinance was not
preempted by ERISA.
The Department of Labor filed an amicus brief in Golden Gate arguing
that the San Francisco ordinance was preempted under ERISA. The Department of Labor contended that the San Francisco ordinance was preempted
for two separate reasons: (1) employers cannot comply with the ordinance
without establishing or maintaining an ERISA plan; and (2) the ordinance
impermissibly interferes with employers’ ability to sponsor and administer
uniform plans.391
With respect to the first argument, the Department of Labor argued that,
to the extent that employers choose to comply with the San Francisco ordinance by contributing money to the city, the ordinance requires employers to
enter into an ongoing relationship with the city which constitutes an employee benefit plan established and maintained by an employer under
ERISA.392 With respect to the second argument, the Department of Labor argued that the law impermissibly interfered with employers’ ability to sponsor
and administer uniform plans because other states could adopt mandates with
different requirements, such as requirements that plans cover slightly different employees or provide different levels of benefits. The Department declared, “It would be a nightmare for an employer to say, ‘I want a uniform
plan[] for all my employees and yet I still have to comply with all these requirements.’”393
The Department of Labor’s new safe harbor—for those savings arrangements established by states for private-sector employees—is clearly inconsistent with the initial position it took in Golden Gate.394 The Department of
Labor, however, has publicly acknowledged that it has reconsidered that position. In an amicus brief that the Department filed opposing a petition for
certiorari in Golden Gate, the Department of Labor declared that it had reexamined its position in Golden Gate and was planning to “issue a proposed
regulation ‘clarify[ing] the circumstances under which health care arrangements established or maintained by state or local governments for the benefit
of non-governmental employees do not constitute an employee welfare benefit plan’ under ERISA.”395 Ultimately, the Department of Labor did not issue
the proposed regulation because it believed that the passage of the Affordable
Care Act substantially reduced the likelihood that states would enact additional health care pay-or-play mandates.
391 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Golden Gate, supra note 370 (oral argument of Edward D.
Sieger as Amicus Curiae).
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 See Blass, supra note 131, at 17–18 (arguing that proposed regulation is inconsistent with Department of Labor’s position in Golden Gate).
395 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Opposing Writ of Certiorari at 12, Golden Gate Rest.
Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1515) (quoting Health Care Arrangements Established by State and Local Governments For Non-Governmental Employees, 74 Fed.
Reg. 64,275, 64,276 (Dec. 7, 2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1)).
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The new safe harbor, setting forth the requirements under which a state
automatic enrollment IRA program would not constitute an employee benefit
plan, is clearly consistent with the Department of Labor’s reconsidered position in Golden Gate and, as discussed above, is entitled to deference under
Chevron. The regulation, however, does not address the Department of Labor’s second argument in Golden Gate—that a state mandate may impermissibly interfere with employers’ ability to sponsor and administer uniform
plans. Certainly, in its amicus brief opposing the petition for certiorari, the
Department of Labor made clear that it had reexamined its position on
whether compliance with the San Francisco ordinance constituted an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA.396 The Department of Labor,
however, did not address the second argument— that the San Francisco mandate impermissibly interfered with employers’ ability to sponsor and administer uniform plans. Therefore, no deference need be accorded to the Department of Labor with respect to the question of whether a state mandate that
applies to employers with pension plan that do not meet certain minimum
requirements is preempted under ERISA.
As discussed above, it is likely that such a mandate would be preempted
because it impermissibly interferes with employers’ ability to sponsor and
administer uniform plans.
d.

Summary

In sum, a strong argument may be made that none of the existing mandates would be preempted by ERISA. Although they might encourage employers to establish pension plans in order to avoid the mandate, they do not
appear to have any effect on the terms of the plan and thus do not appear to
impermissibly interfere with uniform plan administration. On the other hand,
if a state were to enact a mandate that applies to employers with pension plans
that not meet certain minimum requirements, the state mandate might very
well be preempted by ERISA because it could influence employers’ choice
of plan terms and thus impermissibly interfere with uniform plan administration.
CONCLUSION
As originally conceived, automatic enrollment IRAs were intended to
serve as a uniform federal retirement savings vehicle for workers without
access to a workplace retirement savings plan. Few, if any, proponents of
396
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automatic enrollment IRAs would argue that a patchwork of state automatic
enrollment IRAs is better than a single, uniform, federal program.397 By definition, a federal plan can cover more workers than any single state plan.
More importantly, a uniform program can benefit from economies of scale
and thus lower administrative costs. Furthermore, with a federal program, the
federal government can enact legislation to ensure that participants’ interests
are adequately protected and the program is not preempted by ERISA.
Despite the advantages of a federal program, automatic enrollment
IRAs have not gained traction at the federal level. On the other hand, a number of states are at varying stages of adopting automatic enrollment IRAs to
fill the retirement savings gap. Whether they can stand up to the task, however, is subject to considerable uncertainty.
First, state automatic enrollment IRAs are unlikely to cover all workers
who do not have access to a workplace retirement savings vehicle. Some
states have expressed no interest in establishing a state automatic enrollment
IRA program, and other states have only expressed interest in establishing
voluntary programs that do not satisfy the requirements of the Department of
Labor’s new safe harbor. Moreover, even those states adopting mandatory
automatic enrollment IRA programs are unlikely to cover all workers who
currently lack access to workplace retirement savings vehicle. Those programs are still unlikely to cover (1) the smallest employers who are the least
likely to provide workplace retirement savings plans and (2) employees who
are ineligible to participate in their employer’s retirement savings plan.
Second, not all workers who have access to a state automatic enrollment
IRA program are likely to participate. More workers are likely to opt out of
a state automatic enrollment IRA program than currently opt out of employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, though it is difficult to quantify exactly how
many workers are likely to opt out of participating in a state automatic enrollment IRA program.
Third, state automatic enrollment IRAs may be costly to administer.
How costly they will be depends on, among other things, how they are structured, how many individuals participate, how much individuals contribute,
and how money is invested. State programs will undoubtedly be more costly
to administer than a single, uniform federal program. Whether their administrative costs would outweigh the benefit of providing a state program is not
clear.
How effective state automatic enrollment IRAs are likely to be in closing the retirement gap also depends on whether plan participants’ interests
are adequately protected and whether employers will shift from existing private-sector plans to state automatic enrollment IRAs. It is not clear whether
current state law would adequately ensure the protection of participants’ interests. Nor is it clear whether employers would choose to shift from existing
private-sector plans to state automatic enrollment IRAs.
397 But see Zelinsky, supra note 365, at 598 (concluding that he “favor[s] state-by-state experimentation rather than any single approach to the task of encouraging greater retirement savings”).
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Finally, the ability of state automatic enrollment IRAs to increase retirement savings depends on their not being preempted by ERISA. There is a
strong argument to be made that programs that do not require participation
by employers that already offer a pension plan are not preempted. On the
other hand, programs that require participation by employers that offer pension plans that do not meet minimum statutory requirements may very well
be preempted by ERISA.

